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Casey Patricia Balio 
MEDICAID ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS: TRENDS, EXPANSION EFFECTS, AND 
EXPRESS LANE ELIGIBILITY 
Medicaid covers 21% of Americans which includes over 65 million children and adults, 
making it the largest single source of health insurance for Americans. As a public program jointly 
administered between the federal and state governments, states exhibit substantial control over 
the structure of their programs, with the intention of modifying programs to fit the needs of the 
state and population. Medicaid has experienced numerous changes at both the state and federal 
levels in recent years which have created novel ways of modifying their structures, many of 
which may have implications for administrative expenditures. As publicly funded programs and 
given the state autonomy over such, it is important to consider the relationships and effects of 
such decisions on the performance of these programs. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to consider numerous variations in state Medicaid 
programs and the state contexts in which they operate, and the relationship to administrative 
spending. This dissertation focuses on three studies including 1) a panel analysis of the trends and 
correlates of state Medicaid administrative expenditures, 2) a quasi-experimental study of the 
effects of Medicaid expansion on administrative expenditures, and finally 3) a quasi-experimental 
study of the effects of the use of Express Lane Eligibility on administrative expenditures. Overall, 
this dissertation provides a better understanding of the variations, correlates, and drivers of 
Medicaid administrative expenditures. 
Nir Menachemi, PhD, Chair  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Medicaid was established with the passage of the Social Security Act in 1965 to provide 
health insurance to low income children, parents, and individuals with disabilities.1.1–1.4 It was 
included as a late addition to the overall Act which focused on Medicare and Social Security. 1.1, 
1.3 In the years after 1965, it became clear that Medicaid was an important component of the US 
healthcare system as it quickly exceeded it’s expected coverage and costs. 1.2–1.4 Since then, 
Medicaid and its more recent partner program, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 
have grown to cover over 72 million individuals in the US in 2019, 1.5 including 39% of children 
in the United States in 2017. 1.6  
Medicaid was designed to be jointly administered by states and the federal government in 
terms of both design and funding. 1.1, 1.3 While there are federal standards that the programs must 
meet and changes must be approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS, 
the federal administrator of the program), states design many of the components of their 
programs. Funding is similar in that there is a ‘match’ between the costs the states incur and what 
the federal government will contribute called the Federal Medical Assistance Program (FMAP). 
1.7, 1.8 For medical expenditures, this is based on the average income of the state. For 
administrative expenditures, it varies by particular expenditure but is consistent across states. 
CHIP programs utilize a different ‘enhanced-FMAP.’ This joint structure was created to allow 
states to modify their programs to fit the needs of their states and constituents. The autonomy 
provided to states has cultivated great variation in Medicaid programs across states, including in 
terms of eligibility criteria, enrollment processes, services covered, and the use of managed care,1 
many of which have possible implications for administrative costs. 
Modifications to Medicaid programs may arise from individual state circumstances or 
stem from federal policy changes. 1.9 In recent years, Medicaid has seen numerous state and 
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federal policy changes including the introduction of Express Lane Eligibility (ELE) through the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA) in 2009, the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) in 2010, and renewed interest from the federal government for the use of 1115 
demonstration waivers to experiment with new program components. ELE is an optional program 
component where other  state safety net programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and the National School 
Lunch Program (NSLP) are able to identify children that are potentially eligible for Medicaid or 
CHIP in order to increase enrollment and create administrative efficiencies. 1.10, 1.11 The ACA 
originally included mandatory Medicaid expansion for all states where those who opted out 
would lose federal funding, an unattractive option to states given the costs of Medicaid and the 
federal match rates in place. 1.12 However, after states contested this component of the ACA, the 
Supreme Court ruled that mandatory expansion was unconstitutional and became optional for 
states. Since then, 37 states including DC have expanded their Medicaid programs. 1.13 1115 
Demonstration waivers were included in the original 1965 legislation establishing Medicaid as a 
way for states to experiment with their programs. 1.9, 1.14 This supported the idea of state learning 
and policy experimentation. While these changes must be approved by CMS, demonstration 
waivers have been used for a variety of modifications including covering additional services, 
requiring cost sharing, and community engagement requirements often referred to as work 
requirements. 1.9, 1.14 In addition to approval by CMS, waivers must go through a public comment 
period and have a formal, independent evaluation. 1.14  
In addition to the numerous policy changes, as publicly funded programs in which 
eligibility is based on income, Medicaid and CHIP are particularly sensitive to economic changes, 
such as the Great Recession of 2008. 1.15–1.17 These policy and economic changes have fostered 
numerous Medicaid changes which not only affect enrollment, but likely affect overall and 
administrative costs of the programs.  
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Historically, Medicaid has exhibited considerable variation in total per capita spending 
both within and across states, and greater variation across the country than in Medicare or overall 
per capita spending. 1.18 Many studies have identified state, political, economic, and program 
characteristics associated with spending, but either focus on overall spending or medical spending 
and do not consider administrative spending. 1.19–1.22 One of these studies identified that much of 
the variation in spending is due to discretionary spending, 1.22 which may suggest that at least 
some portion of administrative costs too are within the control of the state. When considering 
administrative costs specifically, Medicaid often ranks between those of Medicare and private 
insurers. 1.23–1.26 The autonomy of state programs and the variation that exists in overall per capita 
spending in Medicaid suggests that there may also be variation in administrative costs across 
states and time.   
Overview of Dissertation 
The purpose of this dissertation is to estimate state Medicaid administrative costs with 
respect to state, political, and specific programmatic characteristics. Study 1 will use data from 
2007-2017 to describe state Medicaid administrative expenditures, trends, and identify 
contemporaneous state, political, and programmatic correlates of state administrative 
expenditures. Study 2 will estimate the effects of ACA Medicaid expansion on administrative 
expenditures as well as the mediating effects of enrollment gains. Study 3 will estimate the effects 
of ELE on enrollment and administrative costs. 
Study 1 will consider the association between Medicaid administrative costs and state 
demographic, economic, and programmatic characteristics. Medicaid programs exhibit substantial 
variation in costs across the country. 1.18 Previous research has focused on what factors are 
associated with medical or overall Medicaid spending. 1.19–1.22 Factors associated with medical and 
overall spending include eligibility criteria, services covered, and prices. The variation in 
Medicaid spending and program structure suggest there may be associated differences in 
administrative spending as well. This study will build on this previous work by utilizing state-
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year demographic, economic, and program characteristics to describe trends in and correlates of 
state administrative costs between 2007-2017. 
Study 2 will use a quasi-experimental, generalized difference-in-differences (DID) 
approach to compare changes in administrative expenditures in states that expanded Medicaid 
after the ACA compared to those who did not. Studies of the most recent Medicaid expansion 
through the ACA have considered countless effects from those directly intended 1.27, 1.28 such as 
enrollment and access to care to those more distant from the policy change such as receipt of 
payday loans 1.29 and housing evictions. 1.30 While there have been studies that have considered 
the financial implications of expansion, 1.27, 1.28, 1.31 these are less common and have not considered 
administrative costs specifically. Among the collection of expansion studies, many focused on the 
coarse approach of comparing expansion states to non-expansion states by treating all expansion 
states the same. However, several studies have not only estimated effects of expansion compared 
to non-expansion states, but have considered variation among expansions. 1.32–1.34 These studies 
have identified heterogeneous effects of expansion and make a case for considering variations in 
expansion rather than using expansion as a binary measure. As in previous studies, we will 
consider expansion decisions as well as the size of the expansions as the policy intervention. 
Additionally, we will consider the mediating effect of enrollment gains on the causal pathway 
between expansion and administrative expenditures.  
Study 3 will also use a generalized DID design to estimate the effects of ELE on child 
enrollment and administrative costs. The introduction of federal support for ELE began with 
CHIPRA in 2009. This provided guidance on the numerous options that existed in designing an 
ELE program and participating states would qualify for a performance bonus, incentivizing the 
program. Like other Medicaid components, ELE allows for a variety of structures including 
choice of agencies to coordinate with, use of ELE for preliminary eligibility determinations 
and/or redeterminations, and the use of automatic enrollment or a simplified process. Early 
studies of ELE have focuses on the enrollment benefits which have been consistently seen, but 
  5 
 
few consider administrative costs. 1.10, 1.11, 1.35–1.38 Those that do often rely on qualitative data, 
acknowledge data limitations, and find mixed results across agencies. Additionally, while many 
studies consider the variations in use of ELE for automatic enrollment and other ELE structural 
choices, no studies consider the coordinating agency. Finally, these studies often use data through 
2011, however there have been additional states to implement ELE since then in different forms 
and several states have stopped ELE. Our study will improve upon previous work by extending 
the sample time period, consider states that had not yet implemented ELE in the early work, 
consider the coordinating agency/agencies, and will include objective measures of administrative 
costs as reported by Medicaid and CHIP.  
Overall, this dissertation intends to consider the numerous variations in state Medicaid 
programs and their contexts and the relationship to administrative costs. In a time with 
unprecedented rates of change in Medicaid and continued dialogue about the efficacy and 
efficiency of various health insurance programs at the state and national levels, this dissertation 
will provide context and empirical evidence to support these conversations.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
TRENDS AND CORRELATES OF STATE MEDICAID ADMINISTRATIVE 
EXPENDITURES (2007 – 2017)  
Introduction 
Medicaid covers 21% of Americans 2.1 which includes 65 million children and adults, 2.2 
making it the single largest source of health insurance in the United States. Medicaid is jointly 
funded by the states and the federal government and gives states substantial control over the 
structure and administration of their programs. This control facilitates policy learning and 
experimentation as states modify program structures, eligibility, and managed care participation 
in an effort to meet the needs of their constituents and program. Over time, health care costs have 
increased for all Americans; and recent reform efforts including those focused on Medicaid have 
sought to improve the value of care in part by reducing per capita costs. 
There has been considerable variation in overall per capita Medicaid spending both 
within and across states, to an even greater extent than in private insurance or Medicare. 2.3 
Medicaid spending is believed to be a function of state decisions and economic conditions. 
Differences in medical and overall Medicaid spending have been linked to enrollment changes, 
differences in covered services, prices, and other program structural choices, 2.4–2.8 many of which 
may also contribute to administrative costs. Historically Medicaid has maintained relatively low 
administrative costs at approximately 4-5% of total spending compared to those of Medicare (1-
6%) and private insurance (8-13%). 2.9–2.13 But a recent report identified a higher percent 
administration in Medicaid at 10.4% and a greater growth rate in administrative spending 
compared to other insurance types. 2.13 Importantly, there is little consensus around the methods 
and measures for estimating and comparing administrative costs across different insurance types. 
2.9, 2.10, 2.14, 2.15 For example, the recent report which estimated a much higher percent of Medicaid 
spending on administration included other costs outside of the direct administrative costs by the 
government agency. 2.13 Given the variation in overall and medical expenditures across states, 
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national estimates of administrative spending may be masking state differences. At a time with 
unprecedented changes in Medicaid with further reforms being considered, surprisingly little is 
known about administrative costs in Medicaid at the state level, how they have changed over 
time, and whether state, political, and Medicaid program characteristics are related to per enrollee 
and overall administrative costs.  
The purpose of this study is to (1) summarize national and state per-enrollee Medicaid 
administrative spending trends and (2) to identify state, political, and program characteristics 
associated with these expenditures. This study uses state Medicaid expenditure reports from 
2007-2017 in order to characterize state spending profiles over time. Findings from this study will 
be of interest to state and federal policymakers including those at the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services in understanding costs, efficiency, and the variation in programs, especially 
considering that spending in Medicaid, especially through eligibility choices, has always been 
highly politicized and associated with state politics and state philosophical ideologies. 2.6–2.8 
Findings may inform future budget allocation, spending decisions, and other structural program 
decisions.  
Conceptual Framework 
Administrative spending in the US healthcare system has been of great interest as it is 
substantially higher than in other countries and a significant proportion of it may be considered 
waste. 2.12, 2.16, 2.17 Administrative spending by health insurers includes a variety of activities such 
as billing and eligibility assessments 2.18 and therefore is likely a function of enrollment. A variety 
of characteristics including economic, demographic, political, and program structure drive 
enrollment in Medicaid and therefore may be important contributors to administrative spending. 
Our study will consider these categories of state contextual factors as potential correlates of 
Medicaid administrative spending.  
First, as a publicly funded and state-run program, Medicaid in particular may be subject 
to state economic conditions including recessions, 2.18–2.20 and states may be able to affect 
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enrollment through administrative processes required for enrollment. Second, Medicaid 
historically has catered to certain demographics (i.e. low income children and parents and 
individuals with disabilities) and certain populations are disproportionately insured by Medicaid, 
2.21 thus consideration of state demographic characteristics may be related to administrative 
spending. Next, political factors may also be important as governors are often highly involved in 
making changes to Medicaid programs. Previous work on discretionary spending in Medicaid 
identified political characteristics as important correlates of such spending. 2.7 Finally, 
programmatic characteristics such as eligibility generosity, measured as the eligibility criteria for 
parents, are also set at the state level and have been associate with enrollment. 2.20 Other 
programmatic characteristics including managed care coverage and federal match rates may 
shield Medicaid programs from certain costs and therefore may be related to administrative 
spending specifically.  
Methods 
Using a longitudinal, panel analysis, this study considers the association between 
Medicaid administrative costs and contemporaneous state, program, and political characteristics.  
Population & Data 
This study utilizes 11 years of state-year level data for all 50 states, excluding 
Washington, DC from 2007-2017.  The study relies on a novel dataset compiled from various 
public sources. Cost data are from CMS Form 64 in which states report their annual Medicaid 
expenditures. 2.22 Medicaid enrollment data are from Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) reports 2.23, 
2.24 and CMS’s Medicaid Budget and Expenditure System Quarterly Medicaid Enrollment reports. 
2.25 State demographic and economic data are from the American Community Survey (ACS), 2.26 
Current Population Survey (CPS), 2.27 the US Census Bureau, 2.28 and CDC WONDER. 2.29 
Political characteristics were obtained from the National Governors Association (NGA) 2.30 and 
National Association for State Budget Officers (NASBO). 2.31 Program characteristics were 
compiled from various KFF sources. 2.32–34  
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Dependent Variables 
All measures were obtained for the state-year level, unless otherwise noted. The 
dependent variables include two measures of state Medicaid annual administrative expenditures. 
Within CMS Form 64, spending reports include specific line items although for the purposes of 
this study, the CMS defined categories of “medical assistance program” and “administrative” will 
be used. Specific measures of expenditures include the percent of total expenditures that are 
administrative and per-enrollee administrative expenditures. All spending values are converted 
into 2017 dollars using the CPI calculator from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  
In order to calculate per-enrollee administrative expenditures, June enrollment values were 
obtained from Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) reports for years 2007-2013. Starting in June 
2014, enrollment values were obtained from CMS’s Medicaid Budget and Expenditure System 
Quarterly Medicaid Enrollment reports. June enrollment were used because of availability across 
time and sources. After reviewing state-specific trends in enrollment across the transition between 
data sources, state enrollment appears to show a smooth transition across data sources. 
Independent Variables 
Independent variables include a variety of state, program, and political characteristics in 
addition to an indicator for pre, during, or post the Great Recession because of the known 
relationship between economic conditions and Medicaid enrollment. 2.19, 2.20, 2.35 Period 1 is 
considered pre-recession and includes 2017. Period 2 (2008-2009) reflects the recession, Period 3 
(2010-2013) is the post-recession and pre-ACA implementation, and Period 4 (2014-2017) is the 
post-recession, post-ACA implementation. The post-recession period was divided into two by the 
main ACA implementation occurring in 2014 at which time there were numerous changes 
happening in Medicaid that created a different healthcare environment at both the state and 
national levels. These characteristics were selected because of their suspected or known 
relationship to Medicaid costs or enrollment or their common use as controls in Medicaid studies. 
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State characteristics included demographic and economic characteristics of the 
population and state for each year. These included the annual unemployment rate from BLS; 
population size in millions, percent of the population age 25 or older with at least a high school 
diploma or equivalent, percent of the population male, percent of the population age 65 and older, 
and percent or population white, black, all other races, and percent Hispanic from the American 
Community Survey. Birth rate measured as the number of live births per 1,000 population was 
obtained from CDC WONDER. Poverty rate measured as the percent below 100% FPL was 
obtained from the Current Population Survey. State region was defined using the US Census 
Bureau designations.  
Political characteristics included the governor’s political affiliation from the National 
Governor’s Association rosters of current and past governors and the percent of the state budget 
spent on Medicaid from the National Association for State Budget Officers. Governor’s political 
affiliation was measured using the political party of the governor in office as Democrat, 
Republican, or other for at least 10 months of the year. Due to sample size limitations, this was 
recategorized to republican or democrat/other as there are only 3 observations with an 
Independent governor, and all occur in the same state. Governor’s political affiliation was used as 
many Medicaid decisions made at the state-level are informed by the governor.  
While there are numerous program characteristics that could have been included, this 
study focuses primarily on those considered relevant to spending or enrollment. The percent of 
individuals enrolled in managed care was obtained from reports from KFF covering years 2007-
2017, except for 2012. Percent managed care for 2012 was imputed by averaging the 2011 and 
2013 values based on the assumption that changes in managed care are relatively smooth and 
incremental. The Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) is the federal match rate for the 
medical costs of Medicaid which was obtained from a KFF report. This figure is calculated 
annually based on the average per-capita income for a state where those with lower per-capita 
incomes receive higher match rates. The FMAP rate must be at least 50% for each state. The 
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eligibility criteria for parents in Medicaid as a percent FPL was included as a measure of program 
generosity. This measure of eligibility was used as parents have historically been eligible for 
Medicaid across states for the full study period at least to some extent. These values were also 
obtained from KFF reports.  
Analyses 
Descriptive statistics were conducted to describe state spending levels and trends between 
2007-2017. States with average highest and lowest spending levels over time were identified. The 
top and bottom 1 percentile of state-year observations in terms of their administrative spending 
were excluded from analyses as they contain improbable values. Panel regression methods were 
used to model various administrative spending measures as a function of the state, political, and 
programmatic characteristics described earlier. State fixed-effects models were ultimately 
selected based on formal tests, previous literature, and the nature of the data. Several sensitivity 
analyses were also included to assess the robustness of the findings to various analytic decisions. 
These included differing exclusion criteria for implausible administrative spending values 
including removing only the bottom 1 percentile, removing Vermont’s observations for 2007-
2011 based on other Medicaid changes happening in the state during this time, and including all 
state-year observations. Separate sensitivity analyses included lagged versions of the political 
indicators as it may take time for changes in policy under new administration to be passed or 
implemented.   
Results 
Throughout the 2007-2017 period, the national average for administrative expenditures as 
a percent of total Medicaid spending stayed relatively stable between 4.5-5.1%, however states 
ranged from a minimum of 1.7% (Arizona, 2011) to 9.6 (California, 2007, Figure 1). In 2017 
alone, the percent of Medicaid expenditures that were administrative ranged from 2.29% 
(Arizona) to 8.8% (Wyoming, Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Trends in Spending as a Percent of Total Spending 
 
NOTE: State-level trends in the percent of total spending that is administrative are depicted for 
2007-2017. The thicker middle line represents the national average while the three lines above in 
dark grey (Wyoming, California, and Washington) are the states with the highest administrative 
spending over this time period and the states with the lowest measure of administrative spending 
during this time are below in light grey (Mississippi, New York, Kentucky). 
With respect to per-enrollee administrative expenditures, the national average fell from 
$458.33 in 2007 to $377.56 in 2017 (Figure 2). Throughout the study period, the lowest per-
enrollee spending was $123.96 in Arizona in 2011 while the highest was $1148.43 in Alaska in 
2012. In 2017, per-enrollee administrative expenditures ranged from $142.04 (Arizona) to 
$1,126.22 (North Dakota).   
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Figure 2. Trends in Per-Enrollee Administrative Expenditures 
 
NOTE: State-level trends in the per-enrollee administrative are depicted for 2007-2017. The 
thicker middle line represents the national average while the three lines above in dark grey (North 
Dakota, Wyoming, and Alaska) are the states with the highest administrative spending over this 
time period and the states with the lowest measure of administrative spending during this time are 
below in light grey (Mississippi, Alabama, and Kentucky). 
These two measures of administrative expenditures were highly correlated with each 
other (Pearson Coefficient=0.821), however states’ rankings on each measure varied (Figure 3). 
For example, the largest difference in rank in 2017 was in Illinois where it ranked 48th in the 
percent of Medicaid expenditures that were administrative but 21st in per-enrollee administrative 
expenditures, representing a difference in rank of 27 positions. On average across the study 
period, there was a difference in rank of 6.5 positions between the two measures of administrative 
expenditures.
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Figure 3. Cross-Sectional 2017 State Administrative Expenditures 
 
 In addition to variation in state administrative spending, state programmatic, political, 
economic and demographic characteristics varied during the study period (Table 1). Percent of 
enrollees covered by managed care increased from an average of 65.0% in 2007 to 77.6% in 
2017. In terms of political characteristics, the percent of state budgets spent on Medicaid also 
ranged from 4.5% to 38.8, with an average of 22.8%. In addition, 53% of the state year 
observations had a republican governor in office. There were also differences in population 
demographics across states during the study period. For example, the percent of the population 
that is white ranged from 24.6% to 95.8% and the percent of the population that is Hispanic 
ranged from 1% to nearly 49%. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Administrative Spending, Programmatic, Political, Economic & 
Demographic Characteristics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
SPENDING (outcome 
variables) 
Per Enrollee Administrative Spending  
(2017 USD) 
$446.44 $177.87 $123.96 $1148.43 
Administrative Spending as a Percent  
of Total Spending (%) 
5.03% 1.47% 1.70% 9.61% 
PROGRAMMATIC 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Percent Managed Care 73.6% 22.2% 0.0% 100.0% 
FMAP Match Rate (%) 61.4% 8.9% 50.0% 84.9% 
Parental Eligibility Policy (%FPL) 91.0% 55.4% 16.0% 275.0% 
POLITICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Percent state budget spent on Medicaid 22.8% 6.3% 6.6% 38.8% 
ECONOMIC & 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Unemployment Rate 6.3% 2.2% 2.4% 13.7% 
Percent population w/ Bachelor's or above 28.5% 5.1% 17.1% 43.4% 
Total population (millions) 6.40 6.99 0.52 39.54 
Percent Population Male 49.4% 0.7% 48.2% 52.7% 
Birth rate (per 1,000) 12.8 1.7 9.0 21.2 
Percent Population 65+ 14.2% 2.0% 7.8% 20.1% 
Percent Population White 77.5% 12.6% 24.6% 95.8% 
Percent Population Black 10.6% 9.5% 0.3% 38.0% 
Percent Population Other 11.9% 10.9% 2.2% 73.9% 
Percent Population Hispanic 11.0% 10.1% 1.0% 48.8% 
NOTE: Table includes all states for years 2007-2017, state-year observations with administrative 
expenditures in the top and bottom 1 percentile excluded. Washington DC not included.  
Results from the state fixed effects regression analyses identified several state 
characteristics associated with both percent of total spending that is administrative and per-
enrollee administrative expenditures (Table 2). For the model considering the percent of total 
spending that is administrative, several factors were negatively associated with this measure 
including percent enrolled in managed care (coef: -0.007, p-value: 0.023), FMAP match rate 
(coef: -0.019, p-value: 0.046), parental eligibility policy as a percent FPL (coef: -0.006, p-value: 
<0.0010), a non-Republican governor (coef: -0.215, p-value: 0.027), total state population (coef: -
0.536, p-value: <0.001), and the percent of the population ‘other,’ non-Black races relative to the 
percent white (coef: -0.175, p-value: <0.001). In contrast, factors that were positively associated 
with percent of total spending that is administrative included birth rate (coef: 0.289, p-value: 
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0.008), percent of the population age 65 and older (coef: 0.347, p-value: 0.001), and percent of 
the population that is black (coef: 0.268, p-value: 0.041).  
Table 2. Correlates of Medicaid Administrative Spending State Fixed Effects Regression Results 
    Administrative 
Spending as a 
Percent of 
Total 
Spending 
Per-Enrollee 
Administrative 
Spending 
  Recession Indicators     
  Period 1: Before Recession (2007) -0.001 0.29 
  Period 2: During Recession (2008-2009) ref ref 
  Period 3: Post-Recession (2010-2013) -0.085 -24.54 
  Period 4: Post-Recession &  
Post-ACA Implementation (2014-2017) 
-0.366 -85.69*** 
PROGRAMMATIC 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Percent Managed Care -0.007* -0.34 
FMAP Match Rate (%) -0.019* -1.16 
Parental Eligibility Policy (%FPL) -0.006*** -0.46*** 
POLITICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Percent state budget spent on Medicaid 0.000 0.08 
Governor Democrat/Other -0.215* -22.31* 
ECONOMIC & 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Unemployment Rate 0.008 2.55 
Percent population w/ Bachelor's or above 0.033 11.09 
Total population (millions) -0.536*** -17.48 
Percent Population Male 0.046 22.99 
Birth rate (per 1,000) 0.289** 34.03** 
Percent Population 65+ 0.347*** 30.53** 
Percent Race     
Percent Population White ref   
Percent Population Black 0.268* 45.61** 
Percent Population Other -0.175*** -18.74*** 
Percent Population Hispanic 0.152 -12.25 
  Constant -3.417 -1713.40 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
NOTE: All state-year observations for 2007-2017 were included aside from those in which there 
was implausible expenditures data denoted by those in the top and bottom 1 percentile of 
expenditures values. Washington DC was not included in the analysis. Sensitivity analyses with 
different treatment of outliers is included in Appendix A. Sensitivity analyses with lagged 
political characteristics included in Appendix B. 
Regression results for the dependent variable of per-enrollee administrative spending 
were similar in direction and significance with a few differences. Factors associated with lower 
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per-enrollee administrative expenditures include being in the Period 4 (2014-2017) relative to 
during the recession (coef: -85.69, p-value: <0.001), parental eligibility criteria as a percent FPL 
(coef: -0.463, p-value: 0.001), having a non-Republican governor (coef: -22.31, p-value: 0.034), 
and percent population ‘other,’ non-Black races relative to the percent white (coef: -18.74, p-
value: <0.001). The greatest magnitude effect was for Period 4. During this time, administrative 
spending was nearly $86 lower per-enrollee than during the recession. Factors associated with 
greater per-enrollee administrative expenditures include birth rate (coef: 34.03, p-value: 0.004), 
percent of the population age 65 and older (coef: 30.53, p-value: 0.006), and the percent of the 
population that is Black (coef: 45.61, p-value: 0.001). Birth rate and percent of the population that 
is Black were associated with a $34 and nearly $46 higher per-enrollee administrative spending, 
respectively. 
 Results of both regression models were largely robust to sensitivity analyses considering 
different treatment of observations with implausible spending values and lagged versions of the 
percent of the state budget spent on Medicaid. The indicator for the governor’s political affiliation 
was not significant in the model with this variable lagged. Results from these models can be 
found in Appendices A and B. 
Discussion 
This is the first study to assess variation in Medicaid administrative spending across 
states and time. Findings suggests that states vary in their administrative expenditures and several 
programmatic, political, economic, and demographic factors are related to Medicaid 
administrative spending across states. Notably, some of these factors are within the control of the 
state while others are not.  
Factors associated with one or both measures Medicaid administrative costs that are 
largely outside of states’ control include Period 4 (2014-2017). This period is associated with 
significantly lower per-enrollee spending compared to the recession period, but not for 
administrative costs as a percent of total Medicaid spending. During this time there were many 
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changes that occurred both within and outside of Medicaid that may be driving this finding. These 
changes include the many changes with the overall ACA implementation including the optional 
Medicaid expansion, the Medicaid change to using the ‘Modified Adjusted Gross Income’ 
(MAGI) for eligibility determinations, 2.36 and the transition from MSIS to T-MSIS for states to 
report data uniformly to CMS. 2.37 While these changes generally occurred nationally, some occur 
in different states at different times and the experience within the states may be different. 
Also outside of state control is the negative association between FMAP match rate and 
administration as a percent of total spending. FMAP is calculated based on the average income in 
the state where those with lower average incomes have higher match rates. This finding that 
higher match rates are associated with lower administrative spending as a percent of total 
spending may reflect greater health needs of the population and therefore greater medical 
spending for these states.  
The demographic characteristics of the state that are associated with administrative 
spending are also outside of the control of the state. Birth rate and the percent of the population 
age 65 and higher are associated with higher administrative spending on both measures. Both of 
these life stages entail individuals either being enrolled (i.e. pregnant women, newborns, and 
older adults living in long-term care) or unenrolled (i.e. individuals becoming eligible for 
Medicare and may lose Medicaid coverage). In addition, these life stages have higher health care 
utilization and expenditures which may also be contributing to this finding. 2.38–2.41  
The finding that higher proportions of state populations that is black is associated with 
higher administrative spending is also supported by other literature. Historically, Black 
individuals and families have experience more frequent changes in income which may affect 
Medicaid eligibility. 2.42, 2.43 A recent study considering churn in Medicaid after Medicaid 
expansion identified higher baseline rates of disruption in coverage and coverage loss as well as 
greater gains in coverage continuity among minority individuals after expansion. 2.44  
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Several program and state characteristics that are within the control of the state were 
found to be related to administrative spending. Managed care coverage is associated with lower 
administrative spending as a percent of total spending. It would be expected that greater managed 
care coverage would be associated with lower administrative spending at least to Medicaid as 
states are able to shift some of these expenses to the managed care entity. In fact, early studies 
find that administrative spending is higher among Medicaid managed care entities than for 
Medicaid agencies 2.45–2.47 and these administrative costs to the managed care entity are not 
included in the data used for our study. The data used in previous recent work that identified a 
larger increase in administrative spending for Medicaid compared to Medicare or private insurers 
in recent years was driven by increases in other non-medical expenditures rather than those 
accrued by either state Medicaid agencies or CMS, which may also reflect this trend in managed 
care. 2.13, 2.48  
The parental eligibility policy is also negatively associated with percent of total spending 
that is administrative. This may reflect potential economies of scale, as more individuals become 
eligible and enrolled, the state Medicaid program becomes more efficient as reflected in 
administrative costs. There is some limited evidence that health insurance exhibits economies of 
scale in terms of administrative spending, but findings are not consistent across studies. 2.49–2.51 
Finally, having a non-Republican governor is associated with lower administrative 
expenditures for both measures. Historically, left-leaning states have prioritized Medicaid more 
so than right-leaning states, as evidenced by discretionary spending, Medicaid expansion 
decisions, and general support of Medicaid, which aligns with this finding. 2.7, 2.52, 2.53   
Limitations 
While this is the first study to assess and describe variations in state-level Medicaid 
administrative costs, it has several important limitations. First, given the study design, we are 
only able to identify associations between state context and administrative costs, but not causal 
effects of how any of these factors may affect administrative spending. Second, this study only 
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considers differences in administrative spending but does not assess differences in efficiency or 
effectiveness of administrative spending. Importantly, this study does not assess appropriateness 
of varying levels of administrative spending or enrollment or other returns on administrative 
spending that may begin to assess efficiency of this spending. Future work that measures the 
effectiveness of administrative spending would help to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of these relationships. Finally, there are numerous other variations in Medicaid that 
may be considered. This study aimed to include those that are available and suspected to be 
associated with administrative costs, but future studies may consider additional variations or more 
nuanced measures of administrative spending.  
Conclusions 
Overall, this study is the first to assess variations in and associations of state contextual 
factors with state Medicaid administrative expenditures. Findings from this study may begin to 
inform policy discussions around Medicaid program design and funding as we better understand 
factors within and outside of the states’ control that may be related to administrative spending. 
This is particularly relevant as there continue to be discussions both at federal and state levels 
around efficiency and value of Medicaid. Future studies may consider additional variations in 
Medicaid programs and state contexts, decompose administrative spending further, and measure 
the efficiency of Medicaid administrative spending. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EFFECTS OF MEDICAID EXPANSION ON STATE ADMINISTRATIVE 
EXPENDITURES  
Introduction 
Medicaid was established in 1965 as a combined federal and state program to provide 
health insurance to low income individuals and has grown to become the largest insurance 
provider in the country.3.1 States were given flexibility to design and administer their programs 
within federal limits and as such, Medicaid programs vary greatly especially through their 
eligibility criteria for various populations. For example, in 2009 just prior to the passage of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), the eligibility limit for parents ranged from 17% of the Federal 
Poverty Level (FPL) in Arkansas to 275% in Minnesota. 3.2 In 2010, the ACA originally included 
the requirement for all states to expand eligibility criteria for adults to up to 138% of the federal 
poverty line (FPL) or they would lose federal matching funding. In an effort to support 
expansion, the federal government would also initially cover all medical costs for newly eligible 
individuals in expansion states for the first several years. 3.3 After a supreme court case evaluating 
the constitutionality of requiring Medicaid expansion, it became optional for states. 3.4 Since the 
initial expansions in January of 2014, a total of 37 states including Washington, DC have 
expanded Medicaid. 3.5  
 Medicaid expansion has increased enrollment for both newly and previously eligible 
populations 3.6–3.8 which in turn has increased federal spending on Medicaid. 3.9 Although 
enrollment effects of expansion have been well-established in the literature, other outcomes 
including expenditures have been less studied. 3.7, 3.8 One recent study found that while Medicaid 
expansion increased total federal spending on Medicaid, the federal funding shielded states from 
significant adjustments to their budgets. 3.9 They also found no evidence that expansion negatively 
impacted other areas of state budgets such as education or transportation. 3.9 Two other studies of 
the financial implications of Medicaid expansion found increases in hospital revenue from 
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Medicaid 3.10 and lower levels of spending for newly eligible enrollees compared to those 
previously eligible. 3.11 While many of studies of the effects of expansion considered expansion 
dichotomously, a few studies use more nuanced measures of expansion by size and nature to 
better capture some of the variation in expansion approaches. 3.12–3.15 Findings from these studies 
that effects of expansion vary even among expansion states and by size and the nature of 
expansion highlight the need consider more granular measures of expansion. Despite the 
substantial body of evidence around the many effects of Medicaid expansion, no studies have yet 
considered the effects on administrative spending. This type of spending includes eligibility and 
enrollment assessments and processes and unlike medical expenditures was not differentially 
reimbursed in expansion states.  
This study used a quasi-experimental approach to estimate the effect of Medicaid 
expansion on administrative costs. In addition, differences in effects of expansion by the type of 
expansion and the size of the expansion are considered. Findings from this study will help to 
better understand the financial implications of Medicaid expansion decisions and will be of 
interest to policymakers as they reflect on or consider future expansions as well as those 
considering other program modifications.  
Methods 
This study used a generalized difference-in-differences (DID) approach in order to 
estimate the effects of Medicaid expansions on administrative costs.  
Population & Data 
This study utilized administrative costs for all 50 states from 2007-2017 and will rely on 
data from a variety of public sources at the state-year level. Medicaid financial data was obtained 
from CMS Form 64 of state annual Medicaid expenditures. 3.16 Enrollment data was obtained 
from the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) 3.17, 3.18 and Medicaid reports. 3.19 Program characteristic 
data including expansion status and size of expansion were obtained from various KFF reports. 3.5, 
3.20–3.23 State demographic, economic, and political characteristics are from the U.S. Census 
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Bureau, 3.24 American Community Survey, 3.25 Current Population Survey, 3.26 CDC WONDER, 
the National Governors Association, 3.27 and the National Association for State Budget Officers. 
3.28  
Measures 
Dependent variables included the per-enrollee administrative expenditures and the 
percent of total expenditures that are administrative. Administrative expenditures are defined by 
CMS and are reported by each state annually. Per-enrollee estimates of administrative 
expenditures were calculated using state Medicaid enrollment from KFF reports for the month of 
June in years 2007-2013 and CMS’s Medicaid Budgets & Expenditures System reports for years 
2014-2017. All expenditures were adjusted to 2017 USD. While the data does change sources, it 
changes for all states in 2014 and does not differentially affect states based on expansion status. 
Additionally, upon review, enrollment trends appear to be smooth as the data transitions between 
these different sources. Due to a few state-year observations with improbable administrative 
spending values, we excluded the top and bottom one percentile of observations from the 
analysis.  
The primary independent variable of interest is expansion status from KFF’s Medicaid 
expansion tracker in a given state and year. While there are states that expanded early, these 
expansions were much smaller and are still considered to have implemented full expansions in 
2014 or later. 3.29, 3.30 As in previous studies, only the main expansions were considered. 3.29, 3.30 A 
state-year observation was considered an expansion observation if expansion was implemented 
for at least half of the year in that state. More detail on expansion status by states can be found in 
Appendix C. 
Other independent variables include a variety of state economic and demographic, 
political, and programmatic characteristics. State characteristics include unemployment rate from 
the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, birth rate (per 1,000) from CDC WONDER, and total 
population (in millions), percent of population with at least a bachelor’s degree, percent of the 
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population age 65 and older, percent of the population white, Black, all other races, and percent 
Hispanic from American Community Survey. Political characteristics include the governor’s 
political affiliation from National Governor’s Association rosters and the percent of the state 
budget spent on Medicaid from the National Association for State Budget Officers. Program 
characteristics include percent managed care enrollment, the Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentage (FMAP) match rate, and the percent FPL eligibility criteria for parents all from KFF 
reports.  
Analyses 
A generalized DID approach was used to estimate the difference in the change in 
administrative expenditures for expansion states from before to after expansion compared to the 
change in administrative expenditures non-expansion states during the same time period. 3.31 Like 
the traditional DID, this approach is intended to estimate causal effects of an exogenous policy 
change, however, it builds upon the traditional DID in that it considers differences in the timing 
of the intervention across states using two-way fixed effects. 3.31 In order for this approach to be 
appropriate, the treatment (i.e. the expansion states) and control (i.e. non-expansion states) must 
exhibit parallel trends in the pre-intervention periods which was assessed both graphically and 
statistically. Parallel trends were assessed by estimating linear regressions for each measure of 
administrative spending with individual interaction terms between each year and a binary 
indicator for that state expanding during the study (Appendix D). The interaction between 2013 
and expansion status was omitted as a reference as it was the last full year prior to the main 
expansions. Subsequently, a joint-F test was conducted to assess whether all pre-expansion year-
expansion interactions were jointly non-significant. Analyses used linear models of per-enrollee 
administrative expenditures and percent of total administrative expenditures that are 
administrative as a function of the contemporaneous expansion status, state, political, and 
programmatic characteristics. 
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In order to assess any differing effects due to variations in expansions, secondary 
analyses considered the use of 1115 demonstration waivers and the relative size of the 
expansions. Waivers allow states to modify their programs in ways that are outside of federal 
Medicaid regulations. Several states used 1115 waivers to expand their programs in ways that 
differed from the initial ACA provision, such as requiring premiums. Early evidence of some of 
these waiver expansions suggest that they may have differentially affected enrollment and have 
added additional requirements for the states to maintain enrollment 3.13, 3.15, 3.32 and therefore may 
affect administrative expenditures differently. Waiver states include Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, 
Michigan, and Montana. Separate DID models considered waiver expansion states vs all non-
expansion states and separately, all ACA expansion states vs all non-expansion states.  
Due to differences in eligibility criteria prior to expansion, we considered differences in 
the effects of expansion on administrative costs by the size of expansion. We used the 
uninsurance rate for the non-elderly, adult population below 100% FPL in the last full year prior 
to expansion from KFF 3.23 as a proxy for the potential size of the expansion as this whole 
population should have become eligible in expansion states. We then divided expansion states 
into either large or small expansions by being either above the median uninsurance rate for this 
population in the year prior to expansion among expansion states. Stratified models were used to 
consider expansion effects on administrative spending between large expansion states and all 
non-expansion states as well as small expansion states compared to all non-expansion states. 
More detail on expansion size can be found in Appendix E. 
Additional sensitivity analyses were also conducted to ensure the robustness of the 
findings to analytic decisions. First, the main model was run with only the post-recession years 
included (2010 and beyond). Second, we considered lead and lag models to test the results and to 
assess whether there are either anticipatory or reactive effects of expansion on administrative 
expenditures. These models are the same as the main model, but with the expansion indicator 
changed to one year earlier (lead) or one year later (lag). Third, we reconsidered size of expansion 
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using the average uninsurance rate for the non-elderly, adult population below 100% FPL instead 
of the median. The only difference between these two measures of expansion size is whether 
North Dakota is considered large or small.  
Results 
 Expansion and non-expansion states exhibited similar trends in both measures of 
administrative spending the pre-expansion period (Figures 4 and 5). While expansion states have 
historically had higher per-enrollee administrative spending than non-expansion states, the 
percent of total spending that is administrative exhibits the opposite.  
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Figure 4. Trends in Per-Enrollee Administrative Spending by Expansion Status 
 
Figure 5. Trends in Percent of Total Spending that is Administrative by Expansion Status 
 
In addition to graphical assessment, formal tests of the parallel trends assumption 
required for DID approaches confirmed parallel trends in pre-expansion years for both measures 
of administrative spending. Full results from this analysis can be found in Appendix D.  
 On average, per-enrollee administrative spending in non-expansion states decreased 
$35.60 after 2014 from $444 to $405 (Table 3). Expansion states generally exhibited a larger 
magnitude decrease in per-enrollee administrative spending compared to non-expansion states 
according to most expansion type and size classifications. The largest decrease in per-enrollee 
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administrative spending for a classification of expansion states was among states with large 
expansions who exhibited an average $106 decrease after expansion from $508 to $402. States 
with small expansions experienced a slightly smaller decrease of $21. 
Table 3. Comparisons of Pre and Post Expansion Administrative Spending between Non-
Expansion and Various Expansion Types 
Population of States 
Per-Enrollee Administrative Spending 
(2017 USD) 
Percent of Total Spending that is 
Administrative (%) 
pre-
expansion 
post-
expansion 
unadjusted 
difference 
pre-
expansion 
post-
expansion 
unadjusted 
difference 
Non-Expansion 444.11 408.51 -35.6 5.13 5.11 -0.02 
All Expansion 482.24 414.38 -67.86 5.04 4.91 -0.13 
Waiver Expansion 473.71 415.99 -57.72 5.15 5.07 -0.08 
ACA Expansion 484.54 414.04 -70.5 5.01 4.87 -0.14 
Large Expansion 507.84 401.48 -106.36 5.52 5.05 -0.47 
Small Expansion 449.98 428.99 -20.99 4.41 4.74 0.33 
 
 Changes in the percent of total spending that is administrative show similar differences 
from pre- to post-expansion. Non-expansion states had a slight decrease from 5.13% of total 
spending being administrative before 2014 to 5.11% after 2014. Unadjusted pre-to-post 
comparisons for most populations of expansion states again exhibited larger decreases however 
there was an increase in the percent of spending that is administrative for states that had a small 
expansion from 4.41% to 4.74%. Notably, states with small expansions also began with spending 
a lower proportion of total spending on administration than both non-expansion states and all 
other classifications of expansion states. 
Results from the main, adjusted DID analysis comparing all expansion states to non-
expansion states showed a slightly lower but non-significant difference in the change in per-
enrollee administrative spending in expansion states compared to non-expansion (Table 4). 
Separate comparisons of states that expanded using a waiver to non-expansion states and ACA 
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expansion to non-expansion states also suggest no significant effect of expansion on per-enrollee 
administrative spending. 
Effects of expansion when stratifying by expansion size depict different effects. When 
compared to non-expansion states, states with large expansions experienced a significantly 
greater reduction in per-enrollee administrative spending of $77 (p-value: 0.048). In contrast, 
states with small expansions exhibited a modest increase in per-enrollee administrative spending 
after expansion compared to non-expansion states (coef: $50.56, p-value: 0.080). Full results 
from these analyses can be found in Appendix F. 
Table 4. Adjusted DID Regression Results for Effects of Expansion on Administrative Spending 
 Model Comparison 
Effect of Expansion on Per-
Enrollee Admin Spending (2017 
USD) 
Effect of Expansion on 
Percent of Total Spending 
that is Administrative (%) 
coef. p-value coef. p-value 
MAIN 
MODEL 
All expansion vs non-
expansion 
-12.37 0.651 0.12 0.567 
Stratified 
Models 
Waiver expansion vs 
non-expansion 
-19.09 0.683 0.09 0.836 
ACA expansion vs non-
expansion 
-10.99 0.704 0.10 0.664 
Large expansion vs non-
expansion 
-77.08 0.048 -0.41 0.127 
Small expansion vs non-
expansion 
50.56 0.080 0.66 0.009 
Note: Results are from generalized difference-in-differences models using two-way state and year 
fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the state level. All analyses control for the 
state demographic, economic, political, and programmatic characteristics described. Results from 
the full models can be found in Appendix F. Observations with administrative spending values in 
the top and bottom 1 percentile were omitted from the analysis. 
The main analysis comparing changes in the percent of total spending that is 
administrative between all expansion and non-expansion states after expansion show a non-
significant increase (coef: 0.12 percentage points, p-value 0.567). Similarly, expansion showed no 
effect on this measure of administrative spending when comparing either waiver expansion states 
or ACA expansion states to non-expansion states.  
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States with large expansions exhibited a non-significant reduction in percent of spending 
on administration compared to non-expansion states, however states with small expansions 
showed a significant increase in this measure after expansion compared to non-expansion states 
(coef: 0.66 percentage points, p-value: 0.009).  
 Additional models considering only the post-recession time period (2010-2017), 
anticipatory effects of expansion, and reactive effects also show no significant effect of expansion 
on either measure of administrative spending (Appendix G). 
There are slight differences between results when the average uninsurance rate pre-
expansion is used to model the size of the expansion instead of the median as presented, but only 
for per-enrollee administrative spending. In the median cutoff model presented earlier, states with 
large expansions had significant reductions in administrative spending compared to non-
expansion states post-expansion (coef: -77.08, p-value: 0.048). When the average cutoff is used to 
differentiate states with small and large expansions, there is a more modest decrease for states 
with large expansions (coef: -66.95, p-value: 0.077). Additionally, there was a modest increase in 
per-enrollee administrative spending for states with small expansions compared to non-expansion 
when using the median cutoff (coef: 50.57, p-value: 0.080) but models using the average cutoff 
show a significant increase (coef: 58.61, p-value 0.028). 
Discussion 
Using a quasi-experimental design, our study found limited effects of Medicaid 
expansion on Medicaid administrative spending. More specifically, there is no statistically 
significant effect of expansion when considering all expansion states, waiver expansion states 
only, or ACA expansion states only relative to all non-expansion states. However, statistically 
significant differences are observed when the size of the expansion is considered. There is modest 
evidence suggesting states with large expansions saw reductions in administrative costs after 
expansion relative to non-expansion states while states with small expansions incurred increases 
in administrative costs after expansion.  
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Findings from this study contribute to the growing body of rigorous evidence of the 
effects of Medicaid expansion including increased access to care, health status, reduced mortality, 
and financial implications. 3.7, 3.8, 3.33, 3.34 In addition, a few studies have begun to consider more 
nuanced variations in Medicaid programs beyond simple expansion or not, 3.13–3.15, 3.32, 3.35 and 
findings from our study reinforce the need for such approaches.  
There are many possible reasons for this difference in effect by expansion size. States 
with larger expansions may experience economies of scale, where it becomes less expensive and 
they become more efficient as more individuals are enrolled in the program. Early work across 
commercial health insurance and Medicare provide some evidence that various components of 
health insurance administrative expenditures may benefit from economies of scale, however not 
all studies find economies of scale. 3.36–3.38  
The increase in administrative spending in small expansion states after expansion 
compared to non-expansion states may be driven by different reasons. First, reimbursement rates 
for Medicaid vary geographically by region and expansion decisions and size is also more 
common in certain regions. In addition, states with small expansions have generally had more 
generous Medicaid programs. 3.35 It is important to note that differences in administrative 
expenditures alone does not assess the efficiency or effectiveness of those administrative dollars. 
States with higher administrative spending may be either unnecessarily spending more or 
achieving more with each dollar. Future research is needed to understand the implications of 
administrative spending on enrollment.  
Additionally, while 36 states and Washington, DC have implemented Medicaid 
expansion after the ACA, the remaining states have yet to expand. Historically, expansion 
decisions have largely been driven by state politics and interest groups, rather than need. 3.39–3.42 
However, there appears to be increasing support from previously reluctant states. 3.43, 3.44 On 
average, the states that have not expanded would have large expansions as they generally have 
low eligibility thresholds for parents, childless adults are not eligible, and they have high 
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uninsurance rates. 3.45, 3.46 Findings from our study suggest they may be more likely to see greater 
reductions in administrative costs in terms of per-enrollee administrative spending and percent of 
Medicaid spending that is administrative. As states that have not expanded continue to be 
consider expansion, 3.5 the growing body of evidence that expansion has beneficial effects on 
access to care, some measures of health, and potential financial benefits is important to consider.  
Limitations 
 This is the first study to assess the effects of Medicaid expansion on administrative 
spending, however it is not without limitations. First, main results consider the effects of 
expansion on these two measures of administrative spending but cannot assess the efficiency or 
appropriateness of spending. Second, most expansions were implemented in 2014 during the 
same year which many other provisions of the ACA were being implemented. These could be 
contributing to some of our results, but only if other ACA provisions are happening differentially 
in expansion and non-expansion states.  
Conclusions 
 In summary, our study provides rigorous evidence on the effects of Medicaid expansion 
on administrative expenditures. More specifically, it appears as though states were largely able to 
expand Medicaid without differentially affecting administrative spending compared to non-
expansion states with the exception of small expansion states. Findings from this study may better 
inform discussions within states considering additional modifications to their Medicaid programs, 
particularly those that would have a large potential expansion. Additionally, our study provides 
additional evidence that variations across expansions may be important to consider in order to 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the effects. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EFFECTS OF EXPRESS LANE ELIGIBILITY ON MEDICAID ADMINISTRATIVE 
EXPENDITURES 
Introduction 
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) provide insurance 
coverage for nearly 36 million children in the US,4.1 yet 5% of children were uninsured nationally 
in 2017.2 State-level child uninsurance rates ranged from 1% in Massachusetts to 11% in Texas. 
4.2 Historically, over half of children that are uninsured are eligible for Medicaid or CHIP in their 
states but remain uninsured due to enrollment barriers and lapses between coverage as eligibility 
changes. 4.3–4.6 Numerous recent efforts, including the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA), have attempted to support enrollment and insurance 
coverage for children. 4.6 One change included in CHIPRA was federal support of Express Lane 
Eligibility (ELE). This program allows for state agencies other than Medicaid and/or CHIP to 
identify children who are potentially eligible for Medicaid or CHIP. State agencies which may 
serve as partners for ELE include the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), the National 
School Lunch Program (NSLP), and state tax agencies. 4.7 It was anticipated that in addition to 
streamlining child health insurance enrollment, ELE may also result in administrative savings. 4.8, 
4.9 In 2016, 14 states had some form of ELE in place. 4.10   
 CHIPRA provides states with great flexibility in designing their own ELE processes. 
ELE programs vary in terms of use within Medicaid and/or CHIP, with which other state agencies 
are involved, whether ELE is used for preliminary determinations and/or redetermination, and the 
use of automatic enrollment. 4.8, 4.13, 4.14  As an optional and novel program with varying structures, 
CHIPRA required that ELE programs be subject to evaluations. These evaluations and 
subsequent additional evidence have identified differences in the effectiveness of ELE programs 
by state and ELE structure. 4.8–4.10, 4.15 Overall, ELE resulted in a widespread increase in 
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enrollment across ELE implementation states, with the greatest enrollment gains among states 
with automated systems rather than simplified applications or procedures. 4.8, 4.9, 4.15–4.18 While it is 
clear that there are enrollment gains associated with ELE, administrative savings appear to be less 
consistently considered, have somewhat mixed results, and analyses and data contain limitations. 
4.8–4.10 More specifically, one of the required evaluations found cost savings for states with 
automated enrollment through ELE, however those with simplified applications or processes did 
not experience these same gains. 4.8 In addition, there are initial costs to implementing automated 
enrollment but recurring costs for those with simplified approaches. 4.8 Studies that consider 
effects of ELE on administrative costs identify limitations of these data and analyses including a 
short follow up period, relying on qualitative assessments and limited available data, are often 
subject to recall bias, and inability to consider more recent ELE implementations. 4.7–4.9, 4.15  
The purpose of this study is to estimate the effects of ELE on Medicaid administrative 
costs. We will exploit variation in implementation of any ELE as well as variation among ELE 
programs such as by the use of automatic enrollment and use for initial determination or 
redeterminations. This study will improve upon previous work by considering additional years of 
data, new state ELE implementations that have not been included in previous studies, and 
considering objective administrative costs, an outcome that has been rare in prior studies. 
Findings from this study will be of interest to state and federal policy makers involved in 
Medicaid and CHIP program design, those interested in children’s access to health insurance, and 
the continued political dialogue about the US healthcare system at large, including the emphasis 
on value, cost, and efficiency.  
Methods 
 This study used a quasi-experimental design with data from all 50 states from 2007-2017 
in order to estimate the effects of ELE on child enrollment and administrative costs.  
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Population & Data 
Medicaid administrative expenditures were compiled from CMS form 64 which reflects 
annual expenditures, divided into medical and administrative spending. 4.19 ELE data was 
compiled from various sources including the CMS ELE tracker, 4.20 state Medicaid Plan 
Amendments, 4.21 and the 2016 Office of the Inspector General Report. 4.10 State demographic and 
economic characteristics were obtained from American Community Survey, 4.22 Current 
Population Survey, 4.23 US Census Bureau, 4.24 and CDC WONDER. 4.25 Political characteristics 
were obtained from the National Governors Association4.26 and National Association of State 
Budget Officers. 4.27 Medicaid and CHIP program characteristics will be obtained from various 
KFF reports. 4.28–4.30  
Measures 
 Dependent variables include two measures of administrative spending; per-enrollee 
administrative spending and the percent of total spending that is administrative. All spending 
values were adjusted to 2017 USD. State year observations in the top and bottom 1 percentile of 
each of these measures were removed from analyses as they represent implausible values. 
 The primary independent variable will be the use of ELE within a state-year observation. 
Additional analyses will use ELE approach instead, characterized by ELE use for preliminary 
determination or redetermination, and automatic enrollment, simplified application, or simplified 
process. Due to some differences in ELE implementation characteristics and dates across sources, 
four state-year observations were excluded because of unreconcilable differences. A more 
detailed description of ELE data can be found in Appendix H. 
Control variables will include state demographic, economic, political, and programmatic 
characteristics. These characteristics were selected because of their known associations with 
Medicaid expenditures and enrollment. Demographic characteristics will include the total 
population of the state, percent of the state that are above 65, number of live births per 1,000 as a 
measure of growth for the state. Economic characteristics will include the poverty and 
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unemployment rates. Political characteristics will include the political affiliation of the governor 
and percent of the state budget spent on Medicaid. Programmatic characteristics will include 
eligibility criteria for parents as a measure of program generosity, the match rate for medical 
expenditures, and Medicaid expansion status after the Affordable Care Act.  
Analyses 
 In order to estimate the effects of differently timed ELE implementations, we will use a 
generalized difference-in-differences (DID) approach to compare the change in administrative 
spending and enrollment in states that implemented ELE compared to those who did not. This 
approach uses two-way fixed effects in order to address the differences in timing of the 
intervention across states. Analyses will include previously described state demographic, 
economic, political, and programmatic characteristics as covariates in the models. A total of four 
models were included; the first set will estimate the effect of ELE overall on each of the two 
expenditure measures and the second set of analyses will consider the effect of specific ELE 
approaches commonly used by states for each of the expenditures measures. Sensitivity analyses 
were conducted to consider differences in ELE implementation data across sources as well as to 
exclude years post Medicaid expansions to ensure expansion decisions or implementations were 
not driving any results of the effects of ELE. 
 Because early evidence of ELE suggested there may be an initial increase in 
administrative spending to implement the program followed by an expected decrease, we also 
consider changes in the effect overtime. However, due to the variation that exists in ELE 
approach and the relatively few state-years with each ELE approach type, consideration of the 
non-linear effects of implementing ELE will be presented descriptively. 
Results 
During our study period, 10 states implemented some form of ELE in their Medicaid 
programs (Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Oregon, and South Carolina, Table 5). Of those, 4 included some form of automated enrollment 
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and 2 used ELE for both initial and redeterminations. The most common ELE partnering agency 
was SNAP followed by TANF. The two most common ELE approaches were a simplified 
process or procedure for initial determinations (n=33 state-year observations) and automated ELE 
for both initial and redeterminations (n=12 state-year observations). No other ELE approach 
represented more than 10 state-year observations and thus all other ELE approaches were 
categorized as ‘other ELE approach’ (n=21 state-year observations).  
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Table 5. Descriptions of ELE Approach by State 
State Description of ELE Approach 
Alabama 
• Simplified for initial determinations with SNAP & TANF starting in 2010 
• Simplified for redeterminations with SNAP & TANF starting in 2009, 
transitions to automated in 2013 
Colorado • Automated for initial determinations with NSLP starting in 2013 
Georgia 
• Simplified for initial determinations with WIC starting in 2011, ends in 
2016 
Iowa • Simplified for initial determinations with SNAP starting in 2010 
Louisiana 
• Automated for initial determinations with SNAP starting in 2010 
• Automated for redeterminations with SNAP starting in 2010 
Maryland 
• Simplified for initial determinations with state tax agency starting in 2008 
• Unclear if stopped in 2016-2017, these years excluded from analysis 
Massachusetts • Automated for redeterminations with SNAP starting in 2012 
New Jersey 
• Simplified for initial determinations with state tax agency starting in 2009 
• NSLP added in 2011 
Oregon 
• Simplified for initial determinations with SNAP starting in 2010 
• Unclear if stopped in 2016-2017, these years excluded from analysis 
South Carolina 
• Automated for initial determinations with SNAP and TANF starting in 2012 
• Automated for redeterminations with SNAP and TANF starting in 2011 
 
There are some differences in economic, demographic, political, and programmatic 
characteristics between states with ELE compared to those without and as such, all characteristics 
considered were included in regression models (Table 6). 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for States with no ELE Compared to Any ELE During the Study 
Period 
 
No ELE Any ELE p-value 
 
(n=451) (n=110) 
 
 
mean or count SD or % mean or count SD or % 
 
Per-Enrollee Admin Spending 457.87 180.08 410.53 180.22 0.014 
Percent of Total Spending Admin 5.13 1.54 4.69 1.21 0.005 
Percent Managed Care 71.2 24.4 79.4 14.3 <0.001 
Expanded Medicaid 93 20.60% 26 23.60% 0.49 
FMAP Match Rate 61.6 8.9 61.1 9.2 0.61 
Parental Eligibility Policy %FPL 95.7 59.13 89.2 50.3 0.29 
Percent of State Spending on Medicaid 23.0 6.8 21.2 3.7 0.009 
Governor Democrat/Other 214 47.50% 48 43.60% 0.47 
Unemployment Rate 6.2 2.2 6.5 2.1 0.24 
Percent Bachelor's Degree or Above 28.6 5.9 30.7 6.5 0.001 
Total Population millions 6.3 7.7 5.8 2.1 0.51 
Percent Population Male 49.4 0.8 49.0 0.6 <0.001 
Birth Rate per 1,000 12.9 1.8 12.6 1.1 0.085 
Percent Population Age 65+ 14.2 2.1 13.8 1.7 0.1 
Percent Population White 78.0 13.9 72.8 11.1 <0.001 
Percent Population Black 9.6 9.9 17.6 12.2 <0.001 
Percent Population Other 12.5 11.8 9.6 4.4 0.013 
Percent Population Hispanic 11.1 10.7 9.7 5.7 0.17 
NOTE: Table shows descriptive comparisons of variables for states that never implement ELE in 
the study period and those that implement ELE at some point between 2007-2017. Table presents 
means of continuous variables with standard deviations and counts of categorical variables with 
percentages. Statistical significance in differences between non-ELE and ELE states from 
bivariate analyses is shown with p-values. 
At the beginning of the study period, per-enrollee administrative expenditures were 
similar for states who never implemented ELE compared to those who eventually implemented 
some form of ELE (Figure 6). On average, per-enrollee administrative expenditures in 2007 were 
$487 for states that never implemented ELE and $477 for states who implemented ELE sometime 
after 2007 (both adjusted to 2017 USD). Over the study period, there was an average decrease in 
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per-enrollee expenditures for both states with ELE and states without, however there was a 
greater decrease in states with some form of ELE.  
Figure 6. Trends in Per-Enrollee Administrative Spending by Ever ELE Status 
 
The percent of total spending that is administrative was lower in states with any ELE at 
some point than those who never implemented ELE for all years of the study period (Figure 7).   
Figure 7. Trends in Percent of Total Spending that is Administrative by Ever ELE Status  
 
 Using the most general measure of any ELE, regression results estimate no effect of any 
ELE on per-enrollee spending (coef: -10.80, p-value: 0.58, Table 7). When considering the ELE 
approach (none, simplified for initial determinations, automated for both initial and 
redeterminations, and other ELE) there is a significant decrease in per-enrollee spending after 
simplified for initial determinations was implemented (coef: -45.54, p-value 0.007). In contrast, 
there are significant increases after implementing automated ELE for both initial and 
redeterminations (coef: 66.17, p-value: 0.001). There is no effect of other ELE approaches on per-
enrollee spending approaches (coef: 14.84, p-value: 0.509).  
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Table 7. Regression Results for Effects of ELE on Administrative Spending 
 
PER-ENROLLEE ADMIN 
SPENDING MODELS 
PERCENT OF TOTAL SPENDING 
ADMIN MODELS  
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
 
Any ELE ELE approach Any ELE ELE approach 
 
coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value 
ELE active 
        
No ELE ref ref 
  
ref ref 
  
Any ELE -10.80 0.575 
  
0.36 0.060 
  
ELE Approach 
        
No/pre-ELE 
  
ref ref 
  
ref ref 
Simplified, initial 
  
-45.54 0.007 
  
-0.03 0.841 
Auto, both 
  
66.17 0.001 
  
1.32 <0.001 
Other ELE 
  
14.84 0.509 
  
0.54 0.004 
Note: All regression models include state and year fixed effects, state-clustered standard errors, 
and controls for demographic, economic, political, and programmatic, characteristics. Full 
regression results can be found in Appendix I.  
 Findings from the regression model for the percent of total spending that is administrative 
estimate a non-significant increase in effect of any ELE coef: 0.36, p-value: 0.06). There was a 
significant increase in percent of total spending that is administrative after implementation of 
automated ELE for both initial and redeterminations (coef: 1.32, p-value: <0.001) as well as for 
other ELE approaches (coef: 0.54, p-value: 0.004) compared to no ELE. There is no effect of 
simplified ELE for initial determinations compared to no ELE (coef: -0.03, p-value 0.841).  
Results from sensitivity analyses are largely consistent with the main models presented here. 
Findings from sensitivity analyses can be found in Appendix J. 
 In order to further investigate differences in the effects of ELE by approach and over 
time, we summarize average spending in each year post-ELE implementation by ELE type 
(Figures 8 and 9). All ELE types appear to see a slight increase after implementation followed by 
a decrease for both measures of administrative spending. 
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Figure 8. Post-ELE Implementation Trends in Per-Enrollee Administrative Spending by ELE 
Approach 
 
Figure 9. Post-ELE Implementation Trends in Percent of Total Spending that is Administrative 
by ELE Approach  
 
Discussion 
 Previous work has identified greater enrollment in Medicaid and CHIP as a result of 
ELE, however the effects on administrative spending appear mixed and less frequently studied. 4.8, 
4.9, 4.15–4.18 The current study builds off of the existing evidence of consider nuances of ELE for a 
longer time frame. Our study finds that while there is no overall effect of ELE on administrative 
spending, implementing ELE in various ways may result in greater increased administrative 
spending.  
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 In early reports assessing the impacts of ELE, the use of automated enrollment was found 
to be associated with the greatest cost savings however it required start-up costs to implement. 4.8, 
4.10 Our regression findings generally align where automated ELE for both initial and 
redeterminations is associated with increases in administrative spending.  
 Importantly, while our findings overall identify either no effect of ELE on administrative 
spending or increases in administrative spending which are contradictory to previous work and 
the anticipated effects of the program, it should be noted that states with ELE in any form have 
lower administrative spending than states with no ELE. Even with some significant increases in 
administrative spending after ELE, states with automated ELE for both initial and 
redeterminations have among the lowest administrative spending in the post period. In addition, 
after ELE implementation, there appears to be a pattern of increased administrative sending 
followed by a decrease for all ELE approaches. This may reflect earlier findings that there is an 
initial investment required in order to achieve savings relating to ELE. 
 Findings from the current study not only contribute to our understanding of the ELE 
program overall but underscore the need to evaluate Medicaid program modifications in a 
thorough way. With such vast approaches to ELE it is likely that heterogeneous effects occur and 
it is critical to understand them in order to make future decisions about these programs. In 
addition, this is one of many recent options to promote collaborations between Medicaid and 
other state agencies. For example, Massachusetts, New York, and Alabama have implemented 
ELE for parents through an 1115 waiver. 4.10 Other examples include Medicaid agencies across 
the country working with corrections departments to help facilitate enrollment after release 4.31, 4.32 
and Texas Medicaid is partnering with the public health agency. 4.33 If Medicaid continues to be 
encouraged to work in partnership other agencies to better assess individual and population health 
and wellbeing, understanding how Medicaid can best do so and in what contexts will be 
invaluable to its success.  
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Limitations 
This study is not without limitations. First, the study uses only two measures of 
administrative spending that are only available at the state-year level and may contain error. 
However, this data is used by CMS to understand and reimburse for administrative spending and 
thus is valuable even given data limitations. Second, these measures of administrative spending 
are at the full Medicaid program level and are not specific to children. As such, they are likely to 
be less sensitive to changes for this specific population. Third, our study does not incorporate 
changes in child enrollment specifically as a result of ELE. As previous studies have found, there 
are differences in how effective various states have been in using ELE to enroll children and our 
study does not provide this measure of effectiveness of these changes of administrative spending. 
Finally, there are many ways in which states can implement ELE and our data includes states that 
have done so in a variety of ways. Because there are many combinations in ELE approaches 
relative to the number of ELE, we may be missing important effects that are unable to be detected 
in the sample. We do our best to assess these variations using various modeling approaches and 
descriptive statistics.  
Conclusions 
ELE was initially touted as a mechanism which would streamline child enrollment into 
Medicaid and CHIP. Our findings suggest that there may be some increases in administrative 
spending as a result of various implementations of ELE, however states that have any form of 
ELE in place on average still have lower administrative spending after ELE implementation 
increases. In addition, previous work showing the increases in enrollment after ELE suggest the 
program is meeting an important and intended goal. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this dissertation was to characterize trends and changes in state-level 
Medicaid administrative expenditures as well as consider relationships and effects of various 
programmatic and policy decisions. To do this, Chapter 2 first described state trends and 
economic, demographic, political, and programmatic correlates of two measures of Medicaid 
administrative spending since 2007. Chapter 3 considered the effect of Medicaid expansion after 
the ACA on administrative spending in addition to considering differing effects by expansion 
type. Finally, Chapter 4 estimated the effect of any ELE policy to facilitate child enrollment on 
administrative spending. In addition to consideration of any ELE policy, the current dissertation 
also described heterogenous effects by ELE approach and over time.  
 As state-run programs sensitive to economic, demographic, and political changes, the aim 
of Chapter 2 was to first describe the trends and levels of administrative spending by state and 
then to consider correlates of these spending levels. Descriptive analyses identified variation in 
both measures of administrative spending across states. In 2017, there was nearly a one-thousand-
dollar difference in per-enrollee administrative spending between the states with the highest and 
lowest spending values. State fixed-effects models identified several characteristics both within 
and outside of state control that are related to administrative spending. Certain demographic 
characteristics such as birth rate, percent of the population that is 65 and older and percent of the 
population that is Black were associated with higher spending levels. Various programmatic 
characteristics including the parental eligibility policy as well as having a non-Republican 
governor in office were associated with significantly lower levels of administrative spending. 
While these estimates are not causal, this study is the first to quantify variations in Medicaid 
administrative spending and to estimate correlates of these outcomes. This evidence may help 
drive conversations about program structures, efficiency of Medicaid, and support forecasting of 
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state administrative spending, especially as many of the characteristics associated with 
administrative spending that are outside of state control are able to be forecasted.  
 Medicaid expansion after the ACA is one of the largest policy changes to Medicaid since 
its creation, however only some states expanded and many did so in different ways. On average, 
results presented in Chapter 3 find that there is no effect of Medicaid expansion on administrative 
spending compared to non-expansion states. When considering how the state expanded, there 
remains no effect of expansion on administrative spending for either those that expanded using 
the ACA mechanism or those that used demonstration waivers. However, there does appear to be 
a differing effect based on the potential size of expansion. Depending on the model and outcome 
considered, states with large expansions were observed to have significantly lower administrative 
spending after expansion compared to their non-expansion counterparts while states with small 
expansions experienced significant increases. This analysis also suggested that on average, states 
were able to expand without greatly affecting their administrative spending. The potential 
implication for Medicaid spending has been noted as a concern for governors and other 
policymakers and a reason for reluctance among several states that have not yet expanded 
Medicaid. Additionally, the finding that states with large expansions may be most likely to 
experience reductions in administrative spending is particularly relevant as many of the states that 
have not expanded their Medicaid programs would experience large expansions. This finding also 
supports the need to consider heterogenous effects of Medicaid policies and structures given the 
autonomy states have over their programs. Overall, this study will help to better inform states still 
considering expansions and to provide evidence regarding the efficiency and value of Medicaid 
spending. 
 The final study in this dissertation presented in Chapter 4 estimated the effects of ELE on 
administrative spending. Findings from this study suggest that there was no universal effect of 
ELE on administrative spending, however like with Medicaid expansion there may be differing 
effects depending on how the state structured their ELE process. States with automated ELE for 
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both initial and redeterminations were observed to have significant increases in administrative 
spending after ELE relative to non-expansion years. States with simplified ELE for initial 
determinations experienced a significant decrease in per-enrollee administrative spending while 
states with other types of ELE experienced significant increases for the percent of total spending 
that is administrative. Descriptive analyses of the average spending for ELE states after 
implementation suggest there may be a non-linear effect where there is an increase in 
administrative spending for several years followed by a decrease. However, on average, states 
with ELE even after implementation spent less on these measures of administrative spending . 
Like earlier work, this study suggests ELE appears to have a nonlinear effect on administrative 
spending and one that varies by ELE approach. Many states have modified, discontinued, or 
considered ELE in recent years and these findings provide a more comprehensive understanding 
of the potential effects of ELE and the importance of structure on these effects.  
 In combination, this dissertation supports greater understanding of Medicaid programs, 
structures, and performance. Healthcare dministrative spending has been of great interest 
nationally in recent years, however Medicaid has often been left out of that conversation. In 
addition, recent changes in Medicaid have sparked interest and concern over implications for 
administrative spending and alignment with the intended goals of Medicaid. The studies in this 
dissertation provide evidence of some of these changes, support of the need to consider state-
specific context and structures, and provide a structure for future studies considering implications 
of additional Medicaid policies and variations. 
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the knowledge base of Medicaid structures and 
performance. As publicly funded programs with a great deal of state control, understanding the 
implications of structural decisions and impact of contextual factors are vital to meeting the goals 
of the program. In addition, states were given authority over their programs in hope that states 
would serve as policy learning environments to continue to modify and improve the program. 
This dissertation provides an evidence base for levels, trends, and correlates of administrative 
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spending and then considers effects of two recent policy choices that have theoretical 
implications for administrative spending. In addition, my work underscores the need to 
thoroughly consider effects of Medicaid policies as they are often structured differently and 
implemented in unique state environments and therefore experience heterogeneous effects. Future 
work may build off of this body of evidence to explore more detailed measures of administrative 
spending, the effects of additional policies and structures, and consider the effectiveness or 
efficiency of administrative spending.  
 
 
 
  
  71 
 
APPENDICES 
  
APPENDIX A: Sensitivity Analysis Regression Results with Different Treatment of Outliers 
Appendix Table A.1. Percent of Total Spending Administrative Model Comparisons with Different Treatment of Outliers 
    MAIN MODEL Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    top & bottom 1 
percentile removed 
All State-Years VT 2007-2011 removed bottom 1 percentile 
removed 
    coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value 
  Recession Indicators 
        
  Period 1: Before Recession (2007) -0.00106 0.995 -0.0439 0.799 -0.0454 0.793 -0.0425 0.806 
  Period 2: During Recession (2008-2009) ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
  Period 3: Post-Recession (2010-2013) -0.0853 0.564 -0.0492 0.750 -0.0567 0.715 -0.0442 0.776 
  Period 4: Post-Recession & Post-ACA 
Implementation (2014-2017) 
-0.366 0.101 -0.207 0.374 -0.183 0.429 -0.162 0.486 
PROGRAMMATIC 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Percent Managed Care -0.00662* 0.023 -0.00847** 0.005 -0.00693* 0.024 -0.00689* 0.025 
FMAP Match Rate (%) -0.0189* 0.046 -0.0316** 0.001 -0.0272** 0.006 -0.0268** 0.007 
Parental Eligibility Policy (%FPL) -0.00565*** <0.001 -0.00551*** <0.001 -0.00483*** <0.001 -0.00492*** <0.001 
POLITICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Percent state budget spent on Medicaid 0.0000507 0.997 -0.00135 0.934 -0.00518 0.751 -0.00425 0.795 
Governor Democrat/Other -0.215* 0.027 -0.177 0.081 -0.239* 0.020 -0.241* 0.019 
ECONOMIC & 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Unemployment Rate 0.00791 0.836 0.0579 0.146 0.0366 0.359 0.0378 0.343 
Percent population w/ Bachelor's or above 0.0327 0.648 0.0751 0.310 0.0678 0.364 0.0713 0.340 
Total population (millions) -0.536*** <0.001 -0.516*** 0.001 -0.520*** 0.001 -0.526*** 0.001 
Percent Population Male 0.0464 0.866 -0.135 0.632 -0.123 0.661 -0.132 0.639 
Birth rate (per 1,000) 0.289** 0.008 0.506*** <0.001 0.438*** <0.001 0.439*** <0.001 
Percent Population 65+ 0.347*** 0.001 0.406*** <0.001 0.309** 0.004 0.302** 0.005 
Percent Race 
        
Percent Population White ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
Percent Population Black 0.268* 0.041 0.357** 0.010 0.360** 0.009 0.361** 0.009 
Percent Population Other -0.175*** <0.001 -0.194*** <0.001 -0.188*** <0.001 -0.191*** <0.001 
Percent Population Hispanic 0.152 0.096 0.149 0.121 0.187 0.051 0.182 0.059 
  Constant -3.417 0.796 0.496 0.971 1.695 0.900 2.153 0.873 
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Appendix Table A.2. Per-Enrollee Administrative Spending Model Comparisons with Different Treatment of Outliers 
    MAIN MODEL Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    
top & bottom 1 percentile 
removed All State-Years VT 2007-2011 removed bottom 1 percentile removed 
    coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value 
  Recession Indicators                 
  Period 1: Before Recession (2007) 0.29 0.99 -1.927 0.92 -1.978 0.92 -1.94 0.92 
  Period 2: During Recession (2008-2009) ref   ref  ref  ref  
  Period 3:Post-Recession (2010-2013) -24.54 0.12 -28.84 0.09 -30.44 0.07 -30.25 0.08 
  
Period 4: Post-Recession & Post-ACA 
Implementation (2014-2017) -85.69*** <0.001 -85.44*** <0.001 -83.45** 0.001 -83.32** 0.001 
PROGRAMMATIC 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Percent Managed Care -0.344 0.27 -0.565 0.09 -0.379 0.26 -0.377 0.26 
FMAP Match Rate (%) -1.156 0.25 -1.954 0.07 -1.444 0.18 -1.445 0.18 
Parental Eligibility Policy (%FPL) -0.463*** <0.001 -0.511*** <0.001 -0.433** 0.00 -0.433** 0.003 
POLITICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Percent state budget spent on Medicaid 0.0809 0.96 0.527 0.77 0.0826 0.96 0.116 0.95 
Governor Democrat/Other -22.31* 0.03 -18.63 0.09 -25.94* 0.02 -25.84* 0.02 
ECONOMIC & 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Unemployment Rate 2.546 0.53 6.346 0.15 3.93 0.37 3.935 0.37 
Percent population w/ Bachelor's or above 11.09 0.15 16.42* 0.04 15.43 0.06 15.49 0.06 
Total population (millions) -17.48 0.27 -14.99 0.38 -15.49 0.36 -15.7 0.35 
Percent Population Male 22.99 0.44 33.75 0.27 35.55 0.25 35.52 0.25 
Birth rate (per 1,000) 34.03** 0.004 49.08*** <0.001 41.00*** <0.001 41.23*** <0.001 
Percent Population 65+ 30.53** 0.01 33.29** <0.001 22.14 0.06 22.02 0.06 
Percent Race                 
Percent Population White                 
Percent Population Black 45.61** 0.001 61.63*** <0.001 62.13*** <0.001 62.03*** <0.001 
Percent Population Other -18.74*** <0.001 -20.53*** <0.001  -19.78*** <0.001 -19.92*** <0.001 
Percent Population Hispanic -12.25 0.22 -11.91 0.26 -7.298 0.49 -7.096 0.50 
  Constant -1713.4 0.22 -2747.7 0.06 -2631.3 0.08 -2632.6 0.08 
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APPENDIX B: Sensitivity Analysis Regression Results with Lagged Political Characteristics 
Appendix Table B.1. Sensitivity Analysis Regression Results with Lagged Political Characteristics 
  Administrative Spending as  Percent of Total Spending Per-Enrollee Administrative Spending 
  MAIN MODEL 
Lagged Percent of 
State Budget  Lagged Governor MAIN MODEL 
Lagged Percent of 
State Budget  Lagged Governor 
  coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Recession Indicators             
Period 1: Before Recession (2007) -0.001 0.995 -0.006 0.971 -0.014 0.935 0.29 0.987 -0.05 0.998 -2.33 0.897 
Period 2: During Recession (2008-2009) ref  ref  ref  ref  ref  ref  
Period 3: Post-Recession (2010-2013) -0.085 0.564 -0.090 0.544 -0.061 0.682 -24.54 0.122 -24.89 0.117 -22.23 0.161 
Period 4: Post-Recession & Post-ACA 
Implementation (2014-2017) -0.366 0.101 -0.368 0.098 -0.352 0.116 -85.69*** <0.001 -85.85*** <0.001 -84.65*** <0.001 
Percent Managed Care -0.007* 0.023 -0.007* 0.021 -0.007* 0.025 -0.34 0.273 -0.35 0.264 -0.34 0.28 
FMAP Match Rate (%) -0.019* 0.046 -0.019* 0.043 -0.018 0.06 -1.16 0.254 -1.18 0.246 -1.04 0.306 
Parental Eligibility Policy (%FPL) -0.006*** <0.001 -0.006*** <0.001 -0.006*** <0.001 -0.46*** 0.001 -0.47*** <0.001 -0.45** 0.001 
Percent state budget spent on Medicaid 0.000 0.997   0.001 0.968 0.08 0.961   0.03 0.984 
Lagged % state budget spent on Medicaid   0.009 0.583     0.68 0.684   
Governor Democrat/Other -0.215* 0.027 -0.214* 0.028   -22.31* 0.034 -22.26* 0.034   
Lagged governor Democrat/Other     -0.088 0.359     -15.69 0.13 
Unemployment Rate 0.008 0.836 0.011 0.772 0.002 0.957 2.55 0.532 2.80 0.497 1.919 0.638 
Percent population w/ Bachelor's or above 0.033 0.648 0.035 0.623 0.044 0.545 11.09 0.151 11.28 0.145 11.51 0.138 
Total population (millions) -0.536*** <0.001 -0.550*** <0.001 -0.571*** <0.001 -17.48 0.265 -18.53 0.239 -19.34 0.218 
Percent Population Male 0.046 0.866 0.051 0.853 0.046 0.869 22.99 0.435 23.26 0.429 24.35 0.41 
Birth rate (per 1,000) 0.289** 0.008 0.294** 0.007 0.286** 0.009 34.03** 0.004 34.40** 0.003 33.59** 0.004 
Percent Population 65+ 0.347*** 0.001 0.336** 0.001 0.341** 0.001 30.53** 0.006 29.75** 0.008 30.19** 0.007 
Percent Race             
Percent Population White             
Percent Population Black 0.268* 0.041 0.261* 0.047 0.262* 0.047 45.61** 0.001 45.05** 0.002 45.66** 0.002 
Percent Population Other -0.175*** <0.001 -0.175*** <0.001 -0.182*** <0.001 -18.74*** <0.001 -18.74*** <0.001 -19.02*** <0.001 
Percent Population Hispanic 0.152 0.096 0.153 0.094 0.156 0.09 -12.25 0.215 -12.16 0.219 -12.19 0.219 
Constant -3.417 0.796 -3.632 0.784 -3.355 0.801 -1713.4 0.224 -1726.6 0.221 -1775.9 0.21 
7
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APPENDIX C: Expansion Status, Type, & Dates 
Appendix Table C.1. Expansion Status, Type, & Dates 
NON-
EXPANSION 
EXPANSION 
State State Implementation 
Date 
Traditional/Waiver 
Expansion 
Alabama Alaska September 2015 traditional 
Florida Arizona January 2014 traditional 
Georgia Arkansas January 2014 waiver 
Idaho California January 2014 traditional 
Kansas Colorado January 2014 traditional 
Maine Connecticut January 2014 traditional 
Mississippi Delaware January 2014 traditional 
Missouri Hawaii January 2014 traditional 
Nebraska Illinois January 2014 traditional 
North Carolina Indiana February 2015 waiver 
Oklahoma Iowa January 2014 waiver 
South Carolina Kentucky January 2014 traditional 
South Dakota Louisiana July 2016 traditional 
Tennessee Maryland January 2014 traditional 
Texas Massachusetts January 2014 traditional 
Utah Michigan April 2014 waiver 
Virginia Minnesota January 2014 traditional 
Wisconsin Montana January 2016 waiver 
Wyoming Nevada January 2014 traditional 
 New Hampshire August 2014 waiver 
 New Jersey January 2014 traditional 
 New Mexico January 2014 traditional 
 New York January 2014 traditional 
 North Dakota January 2014 traditional 
 Ohio January 2014 traditional 
 Oregon January 2014 traditional 
 Pennsylvania January 2015 traditional 
 Rhode Island January 2014 traditional 
 Vermont January 2014 traditional 
 Washington January 2014 traditional 
 West Virginia January 2014 traditional 
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APPENDIX D: Parallel Trends Assumption Testing 
The difference-in-differences (DID) approach requires there to be parallel trends between 
the treatment and control observations in the pre-intervention period. Because the intervention 
(expansion) is timed differently across the treatment observations, we assess this in several ways. 
First, we consider parallel trends graphically for all expansion states compared to non-expansion 
states by looking for parallel trends before the main expansions in 2014. Second, we test the 
parallel trends assumption statistically by running a linear regression with each measure of 
administrative spending as a function of interaction terms for each year and a binary indicator for 
that year ever being an expansion state during the study period. We then use a joint-F test to 
assess the significance of all of the pre-expansion years relative to 2013, the last full year prior to 
expansion.  
Appendix Table D.1. Parallel Trends Assessment for Per-Enrollee Administrative Expenditures 
Model 
 
COEF. STD. ERR. T P>T [95% CONF. INTERVAL] 
EXPANSION*2007 53.53679 35.55994 1.51 0.133 -16.31953 123.3931 
EXPANSION*2008 65.80458 35.55994 1.85 0.065 -4.051746 135.6609 
EXPANSION*2009 35.24792 35.55994 0.99 0.322 -34.6084 105.1042 
EXPANSION*2010 0.7889407 35.02717 0.02 0.982 -68.02079 69.59867 
EXPANSION*2011 -2.169947 35.02717 -0.06 0.951 -70.97968 66.63978 
EXPANSION*2012 37.55677 34.52134 1.09 0.277 -30.25926 105.3728 
EXPANSION*2014 -44.19536 35.02717 -1.26 0.208 -113.0051 24.61437 
EXPANSION*2015 -8.617339 34.52134 -0.25 0.803 -76.43338 59.1987 
EXPANSION*2016 -16.14264 35.55994 -0.45 0.65 -85.99896 53.71369 
EXPANSION*2017 -10.36676 34.52134 -0.3 0.764 -78.1828 57.44927 
CONSTANT 442.2284 11.67572 37.88 0 419.2918 465.1649 
F(  6,   528) =    1.09 
PROB > F =    0.3688 
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Appendix Table D.2. Parallel Trends Assessment for Percent of Total Spending that is 
Administrative Model 
 
COEF. STD. ERR. T P>T [95% CONF. INTERVAL] 
EXPANSION*2007 -0.107754 0.2895403 -0.37 0.71 -0.676547 0.4610381 
EXPANSION*2008 -0.096999 0.2939402 -0.33 0.742 -0.674434 0.4804372 
EXPANSION*2009 -0.237695 0.2895403 -0.82 0.412 -0.806487 0.3310979 
EXPANSION*2010 -0.563564 0.2939402 -1.92 0.056 -1.141 0.0138714 
EXPANSION*2011 -0.541829 0.2895403 -1.87 0.062 -1.110622 0.0269632 
EXPANSION*2012 -0.011746 0.2853629 -0.04 0.967 -0.572332 0.54884 
EXPANSION*2014 -0.067188 0.2895403 -0.23 0.817 -0.635980 0.5016047 
EXPANSION*2015 -0.187669 0.2853629 -0.66 0.511 -0.748255 0.3729176 
EXPANSION*2016 -0.273520 0.2895403 -0.94 0.345 -0.842312 0.2952727 
EXPANSION*2017 -0.238421 0.2853629 -0.84 0.404 -0.799007 0.3221653 
CONSTANT 5.172057 0.0968729 53.39 0 4.981753 5.36236 
F(  6,   528) =    1.14 
PROB > F =    0.3395 
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APPENDIX E: Description of Size of Expansion 
Expansion size was proxied using the percent of the non-elderly, adult population below 100% 
FPL that was uninsured in the last full year prior to expansion obtained from KFF. This measure 
was chosen because this full population should have become eligible for Medicaid after 
expansion and represents the size of the potential expansion. Below are the uninsurance rates for 
that state population in the year before expansion as well as if the state was classified as a large or 
small expansion state. The average and median uninsurance rates for expansion states in the year 
before expansion were used as the cutoffs for being a large or small expansion state. The average 
uninsurance rate for these state-years was 32.3% while the median uninsurance rate was 33.2%. 
These yielded the same classification for all states except for North Dakota which is considered a 
large expansion state when using the average cutoff but a small expansion states when using the 
median cutoff.a  
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Appendix Table E.1. Expansion State, Timing, and Size 
State Last full year before 
expansion 
Uninsurance rate (%) Expansion Size 
Alaska 2014 42.99 large 
Arizona 2013 42.04 large 
Arkansas 2013 47.10 large 
California 2013 39.96 large 
Colorado 2013 34.03 large 
Connecticut 2013 26.18 small 
Delaware 2013 24.61 small 
Hawaii 2013 22.06 small 
Illinois 2013 37.00 large 
Indiana 2014 35.58 large 
Iowa 2013 27.53 small 
Kentucky 2013 41.83 large 
Louisiana 2015 35.89 large 
Maryland 2013 27.50 small 
Massachusetts 2013 10.03 small 
Michigan 2013 30.66 small 
Minnesota 2013 21.30 small 
Montana 2015 31.98 small 
Nevada 2013 54.18 large 
New Hampshire 2013 34.88 large 
New Jersey 2013 42.84 large 
New Mexico 2013 47.75 large 
New York 2013 23.63 small 
North Dakota 2013 32.42 large/small a 
Ohio 2013 30.44 small 
Oregon 2013 35.90 large 
Pennsylvania 2014 25.69 small 
Rhode Island 2013 31.80 small 
Vermont 2013 9.23 small 
Washington 2013 40.49 large 
West Virginia 2013 34.03 large 
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APPENDIX F: Effects of Expansion Full Regression Results with Controls Presented 
Appendix Table F.1. Full Regression Results for Per-Enrollee Administrative Spending Models 
  PRESENTED ANALYSES  
All exp vs 
non 
Waiver 
exp vs 
non 
Traditional 
exp vs non 
lg exp vs 
non (med) 
sm exp 
vs non 
(med) 
Expansion -12.37 -19.09 -10.99 -77.08* 50.56 
Percent Managed Care -0.192 0.122 -0.390 0.211 -0.489 
FMAP Match Rate 2.468 3.416 1.129 6.550 -0.900 
Parental Eligibility (%FPL) -0.430 0.0476 -0.532 0.0250 -0.450 
Percent State Budget on Medicaid 0.121 -1.698 -0.302 0.984 -3.009 
Governor's Political Affiliation       
Republican ref ref ref ref ref 
Democrat/Other -18.88 -19.98 -18.63 -27.82 -25.78 
Unemployment Rate 7.030 15.02 9.974 9.596 10.40 
Percent Population with Bachelor's or Above 1.636 0.981 1.154 -8.328 6.009 
Total Population (millions) -25.06 10.29 -17.99 -5.417 -8.847 
Percent Population Male -1.158 -57.54 -0.379 -24.05 -11.89 
Birth Rate (per 1,000) 41.43** 53.33** 44.42** 44.08* 37.40* 
Percent Population 65+ -3.088 -9.143 12.94 -20.93 37.99 
Population Race       
Percent White ref ref ref ref ref 
Percent Black 35.86 -40.22 41.36 -12.20 15.67 
Percent Other -21.14** -18.49 -20.89* -18.81* -25.60 
Percent Population Hispanic -23.67 -48.10* -23.79 -53.63** -18.81 
Constant 88.73 3265.7 -168.5 1988.1 314.1 
N 539 275 473 380 368 
adj. R-sq 0.238 0.192 0.255 0.343 0.181 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001      
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Appendix Table F.2. Full Regression Results for Percent of Total Spending that is Administrative 
Models 
  PRESENTED ANALYSES 
  
All exp 
vs non 
Waiver 
exp vs 
non 
Traditiona
l exp vs 
non 
lg exp vs 
non (med) 
sm exp vs 
non (med) 
Expansion 0.115 0.0877 0.0953 -0.411 0.663** 
Percent Managed Care -0.00530 -0.00272 -0.00562 -0.00155 -0.00790 
FMAP Match Rate -0.00284 0.00631 -0.000014 0.0450 -0.0219 
Parental Eligibility (%FPL) -0.006** -0.00041 -0.007*** -0.00106 -0.00764** 
Percent State Budget on Medicaid 0.000845 -0.0451 0.00861 -0.000056 -0.0239 
Governor's Political Affiliation     
Republican ref ref ref ref ref 
Democrat/Other -0.201 -0.223 -0.176 -0.305 -0.223 
Unemployment Rate -0.0110 0.0190 -0.0140 0.0340 -0.0885 
Percent Population with Bachelor's or 
Above 0.0380 -0.0173 0.0379 -0.0269 0.0602 
Total Population (millions) -0.567* 0.0676 -0.565* -0.393 -0.244 
Percent Population Male -0.0352 -0.346 -0.0102 -0.225 0.0725 
Birth Rate (per 1,000) 0.294* 0.357* 0.307* 0.293 0.225 
Percent Population 65+ 0.212 0.150 0.255 0.0154 0.456 
Population Race      
Percent White ref ref ref ref ref 
Percent Black 0.203 -0.519 0.250 -0.245 0.0486 
Percent Other -0.179* -0.112 -0.184* -0.160 -0.194 
Percent Population Hispanic 0.101 -0.254 0.125 -0.195 0.150 
Constant 2.556 24.53 -0.162 18.95 -4.145 
N 539 273 473 381 365 
adj. R-sq 0.208 0.211 0.213 0.241 0.216 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001    
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APPENDIX G: Regression Results from Expansion Sensitivity Analyses 
Appendix Table G.1. Regression Results for Per-Enrollee Administrative Spending Sensitivity 
Analyses 
  SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
Post-
recession 
only (2010-
2017) 
All exp 
vs non, 
lead 
effect 
All exp 
vs non, 
lag effect 
Stratified 
lg exp vs 
non (avg) 
Stratifie
d sm exp 
vs non 
(avg) 
Expansion -5.491   -66.95 58.61* 
Expansion Lead  18.32     
Expansion Lag   12.63    
Percent Managed Care -0.412 -0.0988 -0.196 0.158 -0.461 
FMAP Match Rate 3.276 3.276 2.760 5.309 0.574 
Parental Eligibility (%FPL) -0.432 -0.434 -0.505* -0.0532 -0.489 
Percent State Budget on Medicaid -1.926 0.0986 -0.404 1.613 -3.890 
Governor's Political Affiliation       
Republican ref ref ref ref ref 
Democrat/Other -21.25 -11.45 -19.63 -24.81 -28.20 
Unemployment Rate 12.82 6.294 8.242 11.23 10.55 
Percent Population with Bachelor's or 
Above 18.07 -8.955 1.075 -2.390 5.381 
Total Population (millions) -23.23 -39.24 -20.85 -8.577 -10.76 
Percent Population Male 2.833 -14.40 -0.232 -10.62 -34.15 
Birth Rate (per 1,000) 44.62* 37.48* 40.69** 48.28** 24.73 
Percent Population 65+ 24.52 -5.078 -5.943 -31.84 56.91 
Population Race       
Percent White ref ref ref ref ref 
Percent Black 68.71 13.52 32.68 16.38 -3.871 
Percent Other -16.28 -25.84** -21.51** -18.00* -26.99 
Percent Population Hispanic -6.184 -22.72 -26.86* -51.23** -10.40 
Constant -1648.8 1411.9 141.6 985.6 1478.1 
N 395 489 539 390 358 
adj. R-sq 0.197 0.244 0.238 0.326 0.212 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001      
 
  83 
Appendix Table G.2. Regression Results for Percent of Total Spending that is Administrative 
Sensitivity Analyses 
  SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
  
Post-recession 
only (2010-2017) 
All exp vs 
non, lead 
effect 
All exp vs 
non, lag 
effect 
Stratified 
lg exp vs 
non (avg) 
Stratified 
sm exp vs 
non (avg) 
Expansion 0.209   -0.329 0.685** 
Expansion Lead  0.220    
Expansion Lag   0.127   
Percent Managed Care -0.00653 -0.00388 -0.00526 -0.00170 -0.00825 
FMAP Match Rate -0.00301 -0.000079 -0.00227 0.0327 -0.00842 
Parental Eligibility (%FPL) -0.00521* -0.00472* -0.0058** -0.00137 -0.008*** 
Percent State Budget on Medicaid -0.0282 0.00283 0.000216 0.00157 -0.0254 
Governor's Political Affiliation    
Republican ref ref ref ref ref 
Democrat/Other -0.180 -0.125 -0.191 -0.293 -0.226 
Unemployment Rate -0.00206 -0.0240 -0.00978 0.0443 -0.0943 
Percent Population with 
Bachelor's or Above 0.129 -0.0159 0.0377 -0.0132 0.0776 
Total Population (millions) -0.463 -0.711* -0.567* -0.406 -0.254 
Percent Population Male 0.0832 -0.0610 -0.0250 -0.253 0.176 
Birth Rate (per 1,000) 0.389* 0.208 0.294* 0.342* 0.129 
Percent Population 65+ 0.358 0.200 0.214 -0.0539 0.558 
Population Race     
Percent White ref ref ref ref ref 
Percent Black 0.248 0.109 0.199 -0.0764 -0.0751 
Percent Other -0.164** -0.188* -0.179* -0.153 -0.207* 
Percent Population Hispanic 0.220 0.109 0.0999 -0.194 0.208 
Constant -11.13 8.144 2.032 18.93 -9.107 
N 393 489 539 390 356 
adj. R-sq 0.233 0.205 0.209 0.237 0.227 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001    
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APPENDIX H: Description of ELE Data 
ELE policy data came from a variety of sources including 1. CMS data table of ELE data most 
recently accessed on March 25, 2020; 2. Medicaid State Plan Amendments; 3. KFF annual 
reports from the Survey of Medicaid Officials; 4. report from the mandatory first year evaluation 
conducted by Mathematica, and 5. report from the mandatory final evaluation conducted by 
Mathematica. There were several differences across these data sources. The data sources given 
the highest priority were the two mandatory evaluation reports from Mathematica. These 
evaluations required thorough and timely evaluations of the status and progress of states towards 
ELE implementation, however they are only available for certain states and in the early years of 
the program. These provided the most detail on actual implementation dates and changes in the 
early years of ELE. KFF reports had more limited data but are available for all states on a yearly 
basis. In order to implement ELE, states use State Plan Amendment modifications. These provide 
detail on the ELE approach and implementation dates, however there are a few instances of 
missing documents. Finally, the CMS data table provides more limited information and includes 
inconsistencies and missing fields. Because of the variation in implementation data, several 
sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess the robustness of the findings to the variations in 
data. See results from these analyses in Appendix J.   
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APPENDIX I: Effects of ELE Full Regression Results with Controls Presented 
Appendix Table I.1. Effects of ELE Full Regression Results with Controls Presented  
 
PER ENROLLEE ADMIN 
SPENDING MODELS 
PERCENT OF TOTAL SPENDING 
ADMIN MODELS 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
 Any ELE ELE approach Any ELE ELE approach 
 coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value 
ELE active         
No ELE ref ref   ref ref   
Any ELE -10.80 0.575   0.36 0.060   
ELE Approach         
No/pre-ELE         
Simplified, initial   -45.54 0.007   -0.03 0.841 
Auto, both   66.17 0.001   1.32 <0.001 
Other ELE   14.84 0.509   0.54 0.004 
Percent Managed Care -0.18 0.701 -0.15 0.760 -0.01 0.177 -0.01 0.210 
Medicaid Expansion 
Status         
Non-Expansion ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Expansion -11.08 0.681 -8.20 0.761 0.12 0.556 0.16 0.418 
FMAP Match Rate 2.57 0.464 3.69 0.294 0.00 0.974 0.01 0.631 
Parental Eligibility 
Policy (%FPL) -0.45 0.065 -0.43 0.080 -0.01 0.003 -0.01 0.005 
Percent of State Budget 
on Medicaid 0.14 0.954 -0.22 0.929 0.00 0.878 -0.01 0.741 
Governor's Political 
Affiliation         
Republican ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Democrat/Other -20.14 0.115 -20.68 0.095 -0.20 0.135 -0.22 0.096 
Unemployment rate 7.70 0.400 8.17 0.381 0.00 0.990 0.01 0.917 
Percent Bachelor's 
Degree or Above 1.88 0.861 3.38 0.741 0.02 0.827 0.04 0.675 
Total Population 
(millions) -26.66 0.221 -27.78 0.214 -0.55 0.040 -0.56 0.042 
Percent of Population 
Male -0.79 0.976 -8.07 0.756 -0.03 0.901 -0.10 0.689 
Birth Rate (per 1,000) 42.45 0.002 43.68 0.001 0.32 0.004 0.34 0.002 
Percent of Population 
65+ -4.60 0.869 -8.36 0.760 0.20 0.378 0.16 0.477 
Population Race         
Percent of Population 
White ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Percent of Population 
Black 35.87 0.164 38.61 0.120 0.20 0.295 0.24 0.137 
Percent of Population 
Other Race -21.29 0.008 -22.00 0.006 -0.18 0.015 -0.18 0.010 
Percent of Population 
Hispanic -21.38 0.088 -20.15 0.095 0.10 0.435 0.11 0.369 
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APPENDIX J: Regression Results from ELE Sensitivity Analyses 
Several sensitivity analyses were conducted based on variations in ELE policy data across 
sources and to exclude post-Medicaid expansion years from the data. Findings from sensitivity 
analyses are all qualitatively similar to the main findings presented in terms of direction and 
significance of coefficient estimates. 
• Sensitivity analysis 1 includes New Jersey having active ELE in 2017. In the main model, 
New Jersey 2017 was excluded from the analysis because these years were not 
considered active ELE in the KFF 2017 report however there was no other evidence that 
New Jersey terminated their ELE program during the study period. 
•  Sensitivity analysis 2 includes Maryland having active ELE in 2016 and 2017. In the 
main model, Maryland 2016 and 2017 were excluded from the analysis because these 
years were not considered active ELE in the KFF 2017 report however there was no other 
evidence that Maryland terminated their program during the study period. 
• Sensitivity analysis 3 excludes South Carolina’s use of ELE for initial determinations 
throughout the study period. In the main model, South Carolina is considered to have 
ELE for initial determinations starting in 2013. KFF reports and the final year findings 
from the Mathematica evaluation report suggest that South Carolina had ELE for initial 
determinations starting in September of 2012 however neither the CMS table nor South 
Carolina State Plan Amendments reflect this.  
• Sensitivity analysis 4 considers only the years prior to main Medicaid expansions of 
2014. While expansion indicators are included in the main models presented, this analysis 
supplements these to ensure that any findings of the effects of ELE are not being driven 
indirectly through Medicaid expansion decisions and implementation.  
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Appendix Table J.1. Results from Sensitivity Analyses for Per-Enrollee Models 
 Per-Enrollee Admin Models 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 1- 
NJ 2017 on 
Sensitivity Analysis 2- 
MD 2016 & 2017 on 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 3- 
SC Initial 
Det off 
entire time 
Sensitivity Analysis 4- 
Pre-Expansion only 
(2013 and earlier) 
 
any 
ELE 
ELE 
approach 
any 
ELE 
ELE 
approach 
ELE 
approach 
any 
ELE 
ELE 
approach 
ELE active        
No ELE ref  ref   ref  
Any ELE -11.62  -11.21   -8.08  
ELE 
Approach        
No/pre-ELE  ref  ref ref  ref 
Simplified, 
initial  -47.57**  -57.50** -44.79**  -60.06* 
Auto, both  66.01**   66.21** 69.68*  69.60** 
Other ELE  15.28   13.76 22.38   44.19* 
 
Appendix Table J.2. Results from Sensitivity Analyses for Percent of Total Spending that is 
Administrative Models 
 Percent of Total Spending that is Administrative Models 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 1- 
NJ 2017 on 
Sensitivity Analysis 2- 
MD 2016 & 2017 on 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 3- 
SC Initial 
Det off 
entire time 
Sensitivity Analysis 4- 
Pre-Expansion only 
(2013 and earlier) 
 
any 
ELE 
ELE 
approach 
any 
ELE 
ELE 
approach 
ELE 
approach 
any 
ELE 
ELE 
approach 
ELE active        
No ELE ref  ref   ref  
Any ELE 0.35  0.35   0.20  
ELE 
Approach        
No/pre-ELE  ref  ref ref  ref 
Simplified, 
initial  -0.04  -0.12 -0.02  -0.26 
Auto, both  1.32***  1.32*** 1.09***  1.17*** 
Other ELE  0.54**  0.53** 0.70**  0.57** 
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suicide, & future health. Presentation at Faces of Suicide Conference, Gary, IN, Nov. 2, 
2018.  
6. Balio CP, Apathy NC, Wiley, KK. Patient-Centered Medical Home Patients Have Fewer 
Hospitalizations: An Analysis Using MEPS Data. Poster presentation at AcademyHealth 
Annual Research Meeting, Seattle, WA, June 24-26, 2018.  
7. Balio CP. The relationship between adverse childhood experiences, substance misuse, 
and future health. Podium presentation at Indiana State Epidemiological Outcomes 
Workgroup Annual Symposium, Indianapolis, IN, May 18, 2018.  
8. Balio CP & Wiley, KK. Does incorporating unstructured data provide more accurate 
prevalence estimates of opioid misuse than structured data alone? Podium presentation at 
  
Indiana State Epidemiological Outcomes Workgroup Annual Symposium, Indianapolis, 
IN, May 18, 2018.  
9. Apathy NC, Balio CP, Danek RL. Underrepresentation of health information technology 
studies in the context of accountable care organizations: Using the HSRProj database. 
Poster presentation at AcademyHealth Annual Research Meeting, New Orleans, LA, June 
25-27, 2017.  
 
BOOK CHAPTERS 
1. Menachemi N, Balio CP. (Forthcoming) Understanding Revenue and Delivery Models in 
the United States Healthcare System, in Boulton, ML, and Wallace, RB, Maxcy-
Rosenau-Last Public Health and Preventive Medicine, 16th ed. New York, NY: McGraw-
Hill. 
  
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
 
Instructor, H346: Organizational Behavior & Human Resources for   Fall, 2019 
Healthcare  
Undergraduate course, hybrid 
Enrollment: 42 
 
Teaching Assistant, H101: Influencing the Public’s Health    Fall 2018,  
 Undergraduate Course, online and in-person versions   Spring 2019 
 Enrollment: 41-52 
 
Teaching Assistant, H501: US Health Care System and Health Policy  
 Summer 2018 
 Master of Public Health course, online 
 Enrollment: 36 
 
Teaching Assistant, Leadership in Healthcare Administration  Fall 2017 
 Master of Health Administration course, in-person 
 Enrollment: 29 
 
AWARDS AND HONORS 
 
HSRProj Student Competition Winner (with team)   2017 
AcademyHealth student chapter competition  
 
Teacher of Excellence Award       2016 
MeckEd award for Charlotte-Mecklenberg Schools elementary, middle,  
and high school educators 
 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP 
  
Member, AcademyHealth, 2017 - current 
Member, Academy of Management, 2017 - current 
